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ABSTRACT 
Threats of terrorism and insurgency along the Southwest border are typically supported 
by anecdotal evidence rather than objective assessments of such threats, which limit the 
ability to appropriately address issues related to homeland security, such as immigration 
enforcement and border security. This thesis provides an objective assessment of the 
potential for terrorist and insurgent threats to emanate from within the Southwest 
Hispanic Community by reviewing the status of and pressures upon the community using 
Social Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory. Data indicates that Hispanics 
in the Southwest typically experience greater disparities in sociocultural, economic, and 
political conditions due to regional ethnic concentration. External and internal pressures, 
represented by immigration policy and mandates for language usage, also have greater 
impact upon the community. Social Identity Theory provides a means for understanding 
“why” social movement form, while Resource Mobilization Theory provides insight into 
“how” movements are created. The potential for radicalization is also examined to 
determine if violent movements can develop from otherwise nonviolent movements or 
communities. Despite disparities and significant pressure, the conclusion is that there are 
no current homeland security threats of terrorism or insurgency and the adoption of 
omnicultural policies can further reduce what limited potential may exist. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
Homeland Security threats of terrorism and insurgency along the Southwest 
border are often discussed within the framework of immigration enforcement and reform, 
border security improvements, and the need to combat transnational drug trafficking. Dr. 
Jack Riley testified before the Committee on Homeland Security that the “border threat is 
not just a southern phenomenon”1 while attempting to draw attention to the northern 
border as a conduit for terrorists. The implication being that the use of the southern 
border as a conduit for terrorists is a given. Representative Lamar Smith recently wrote 
that the “9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated a need to secure our borders and enforce our 
immigration laws.”2 Additionally a growing body of research and discussion indicates 
that the Mexican government and general population are experiencing serious security 
threats from the drug cartels and raise the possibility of an increased potential for 
spillover crimes within the United States (U.S.).3 Such security threats could include 
insurgency or terrorism; however, links between terrorism and insurgency within the 
Southwest U.S. may be anecdotal rather than systematic.  
Anecdotal concerns of insurgency or terrorism are reflected in reports of 
“controversial” Imams being smuggled across the border,4 and the rise of Hispanic 
nationalist movements5 within the U.S., which increases the fear of security threats 
                                                 
1 Jack K. Riley, Border Security and the Terrorist Threat (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006), 3. 
2 Lamar Smith. 2011. “Immigration Enforcement and Border Security are the First Line of Defense 
Against Terrorists.” Fox News, September 12, accessed April 17, 2012, 
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/09/12/next-10-years-immigration-enforcement-and-border-
security-are-first-line/. 
3 Kristin Finklea, William Krouse, and Mark Rosenblum, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in 
Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011). 
4 Richard Marosi, 2011, “Controversial Muslim Cleric is Arrested While Sneaking Into the U.S.” Los 
Angeles Times, January 27, accessed April 19, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/local/la-me-
border-cleric-20110127. 
5 Miguel Perez, 2012, “Latinos Plan ‘Occupy Aztlan’ Movement.” Examiner, accessed March 11, 
2012, http://www.examiner.com/civil-rights-in-phoenix/latinos-plan-occupy-aztl-n-movement. 
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emanating from that region and may drive policy. This thesis will attempt to add to the 
limited research that considers whether or not terrorist or insurgent threats have the 
potential to originate from the Southwest, independent of those criminal threats posed by 
drug cartels or others.   
Central to the research question, to determine the potential for homeland security 
threats from within the Southwest Hispanic Community, will be the definition of 
terrorism and insurgency. Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism “as the deliberate creation 
and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of 
political change.”6 Similarly, Hoffman defines insurgency as containing irregular military 
tactics that characterize guerrilla operations and typically involve coordinated 
informational and psychological warfare efforts designed to mobilize popular support 
against a national government, imperialist power, or foreign occupying force.7  
Fortunately, a wide array of tools and techniques, including intergroup relation 
theories, have been developed to study and counter terrorism, insurgency, radicalization, 
and violent extremism. Intergroup relation theories are commonly applied to examine the 
potential or explain the occurrence of terrorism and/or insurgency resulting from 
sociocultural, economic, or political pressures applied upon a specific population subset. 
Examples include “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective”8 and “The Explanatory 
Value of Social Movement Theory.”9 With regards to terrorist or insurgent threats, those 
theories are most notably applied to Islamic communities or countries, reflecting a 
potential gap in the body of knowledge regarding the application of intergroup relation 
theories to other distinct groups, particularly those in the United States. Rather than rely 
on burgeoning anecdotal evidence, this thesis will attempt to systematically research, 
using intergroup relation theories, whether or not homeland security threats have the 
potential to emanate from within the Southwest Hispanic Community.  
                                                 
6 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40. 
7 Ibid., 35. 
8 Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and Alan S. Waterman, “Terrorism: An Identity Theory 
Perspective.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:6 (2009): 537–559. 
9 Jennifer Chandler, “The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory.” Strategic Insights, Volume 
IV, Issue 5 (May 2005). 
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The boundaries defining the research question includes the community of interest, 
pressures exerted upon that community, intergroup relation theories relevant to that 
community, and homeland security threats to be considered.  
The community of interest will be bounded along geographical and ethnic lines 
that identify a significant, growing, and influential subset of the Southwest population. 
While internally diverse, it is believed that the Hispanic community in the Southwest 
maintains a sociocultural, economic, and political status and identity which is distinct 
from the remainder of the population.  
Geographically, the research will only include those states forming the 
“Southwest” as broadly defined and typically includes California, Nevada, Utah, 
Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma. Ethnically, the research will be 
limited to the “Hispanic or Latino” community as defined and used by the U.S. Census 
Bureau, following the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards.10 For the 
purposes of this research, the terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” will be interchangeable and 
include persons of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, South or Central American, or 
other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.11 Therefore, the community of interest 
considered will be the Hispanic Community in the Southwest; with the non-Hispanic 
Community in the Southwest forming the complementary portion of the population. 
The next set of limits are the sociocultural, economic, and political pressures 
exerted upon the community of interest, specifically those  pressures with the potential to 
elicit an unusually extreme but localized response and/or less extreme but widespread 
negative reaction. Such internal and external pressures may be represented by 
immigration enforcement and “English Only” policies.  
Having established the distinct identity of the Southwest Hispanic Community 
and the pressures exerted upon that community, the theories of Social Identity and 
                                                 
10 Office of Management and Budget, “Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal 




Resource Mobilization will be applied to determine the potential for homeland security 
threats of insurgency or terrorism to emanate from that community is revealed.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What potential homeland security threats, from within the Hispanic Community 
in the Southwest, are revealed through application of intergroup relation theories? 
C. HYPOTHESES 
Inherent in the research is the assumption that there is both correlation and 
causation between the potential for a homeland security threat from within the Southwest 
Hispanic Community and internal or external pressures applied upon that community. 
There is also an assumption that relevant intergroup relation theories, such as Social 
Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory, provide a means to reveal that 
correlation and causation. The expected finding is that application of Social Identity 
Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory to the Southwest Hispanic Community will 
reveal the absence of or potential for the occurrence of homeland security threats from 
within that community.  
D. SIGNIFIGANCE OF RESEARCH 
The research will provide valuable analysis regarding the particular community 
researched but will also expand the body of knowledge regarding the ability to more 
broadly apply the analytical frameworks provided by Social Identity Theory and 
Resource Mobilization Theory. As for the Southwest Hispanic Community, should the 
application of those specific intergroup relation theories indicate potential homeland 
security threats, it will have revealed pressures that may be appropriately addressed in 
order to alleviate those threats. It would also be a significant finding to determine an 
absence of a potential threat, due to the application of the specific pressures explored.  
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E. RESEARCH METHOD 
Research related to this thesis will be performed using Social Identity Theory and 
Resource Mobilization Theory to examine sociocultural, economic, and political 
pressures placed upon the Southwest Hispanic Community in order to determine if 
potential terrorist or insurgent threats unique to that community are revealed. A mixed 
method research methodology using components of “ethnography,” along with other 
qualitative analysis methods, will be utilized. Ethnography includes both quantitative and 
qualitative methods to determine the sociocultural contexts in which people live their 
lives, as well as the meaning systems that motivate them. Qualitative and quantitative 
data will be collected and analyzed to determine which variables are the most prominent 
in identifying the Hispanic Community and which variables prove to be more sensitive 
with the potential to elicit strong reactions for that community. In addition to qualitative 
literature describing the communities sociocultural, economic, and political status and 
identity, secondary quantitative data will be collected form open sources that are 
available at government, nonprofit, and private organizations. Examples of those sources 
include the U.S. Census Bureau, the Pew Hispanic Center and various polling agencies. 
Data regarding the identify of and external pressures upon the Southwest Hispanic 
Community will then be viewed through the lens of Social Identity Theory and Resource 
Mobilization Theory to derive qualitative indicators of the potential for, or absence of, 
terrorist or insurgent threats. Should the analysis indicate an existing or emerging threat, 
then the intergroup relation theory will have identified pressures that should be addressed 
positively and proactively to ease effects upon the Southwest Hispanic Community. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Four main categories are implied by the primary research question and will be 
considered in this literature review. Those four main categories are: 
- Intergroup Relation Theories 
- Southwest Hispanic Community Status 
- Southwest Hispanic Community Pressures 
- Homeland Security Threats 
Research and analysis to answer the primary question required a broad based 
review of each topic to identify relevant factors within each of the four categories, 
followed by a more focused review of those relevant factors. Analysis to determine 
whether terrorist or insurgent threats exist focused on Resource Mobilization Theory and 
Social Identity Theory, as those theories combine to examine both “how” and “why” 
social movement can be formed and maintained. The large body of quantitative and 
qualitative data available for the Southwest Hispanic Community was reviewed to 
determine what factors, if any, indicated relative disparity between or increased pressures 
upon the community of interest and the non-Hispanic community. That data was also 
examined in order to ascertain whether any factors or pressures were focused 
geographically in the Southwest. Finally, homeland security threats were scrutinized in 
order to reveal occurrences of radicalization, insurgency or even terrorism.  
B. INTERGROUP RELATION THEORY 
The body of knowledge related to intergroup relation theories may be categorized 
on the basis of four main themes of rationality, material resources, identity, and perceived 
justice, which attempt to address specific questions based on the particular theory. 
Theories based in rationality attempt to address questions as to whether humans are 
rational creatures who know what they do and why. Material resource theories examine 
 8 
whether conflict arises from competition for material resources. Identity theory questions 
whether the desire for a positive and distinct identity is universal, and if categorization 
leads to intergroup bias, competition, and conflict. Finally, perceived justice theories 
explores why people are inclined to see the world as just, even when objective criteria 
suggest a high level of injustice.12 The primary theories utilized in this paper will be 
Resource Mobilization Theory and Social Identity Theory, which are complementary 
theories as the former attempts to examine “how” movements organize, while the later 
explores “why” movements organize. Resource Mobilization Theory, one of the material 
resources theories, was selected due to its emphasis on resource requirements and de-
emphasis of specific grievances in order to determine impacts across a number of 
potential pressures. Social Identity Theory, one of the identity theories, was selected due 
to the emphasis on cultural and social categorizations that can be perceived as distinct 
traits within the Hispanic community.  
1. Resource Mobilization Theory 
Resource Mobilization Theory is one of the major materialist theories relevant to 
the primary question as it probes the capability for movement organization. Pichardo 
provides an excellent summary regarding the development of Resource Mobilization 
Theory and the major theoretical variations of that theory.13 That analysis is repeated to 
varying degrees among other literature that describes the basic theory, its variations, and 
limitations.14 
                                                 
12 Fathali Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations (Washington DC: American 
Psychological Association, 2008), 18–19. 
13 Nelson Pichardo, “Resource Mobilization: An Analysis of Conflicting Theoretical Variations.” The 
Sociological Quarterly, Volume 29, Number 1 (1988): 97–110. 
14 J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements.” Annual 
Review of Sociology, Volume 9 (1983): 527–553; Kathleen J. Fitzgerald and Diane M. Rodgers, “Radical 
Social Movement Organizations: A Theoretical Model.” The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 41, Number 
4 (Autumn, 2000): 573–592; Steven M. Buechler, “Beyond Resource Mobilization? Emerging Trends in 
Social Movement Theory.” The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 34, Number 2 (May, 1993): 217–235; 
Frances F. Piven and Richard A. Cloward, “Collective Protest: A Critique of Resource Mobilization 
Theory.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Volume 4, Number 4 (Summer, 1991): 
435–458; Susan Olzak, “Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization.” Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 9 
(1983): 355–374; Harold R. Kerbo and Richard A. Shaffer, “Lower Class Insurgency and the Political 
Process: The Response of the U.S. Unemployed, 1890–1940.” Social Problems, Volume 39, Number 2 
(May, 1992): 139–154.  
 9 
Two primary models within Resource Mobilization Theory are the 
“entrepreneurial” or “professional organizer” model advocated by McCarthy and Zald 
and “political process” model advocated by McAdam and Tilley. The differences 
between the two models revolve around the role or involvement of “elite” groups in the 
formation and maintenance of social movements; however, both models are founded in 
the basic principles of Resource Mobilization Theory.  
Resource Mobilization Theory examines the rational, purposive aspects of social 
movement behavior.15 A basic concept of this theory, which evolved during social 
movement research in the 1970s, is that the capacity to act collectively upon grievances is 
more crucial to movement formation and maintenance than the particular grievances, 
interests, and aspirations of the movement. The capacity to act collectively is based upon 
internal environmental factors, such as leadership, level of available resources, group 
size, and degree of internal organization. External environmental factors include the level 
of societal repression, extent of external sympathizers and number and strength of polity 
groups.16 
The shift of emphasis from the grievances of participants to the problems and 
obstacles faced by the movement organizer raised questions as to how impoverished 
communities were able to overcome a lack of resources to create organizational structures 
for social movements.17 Attempts to answer those questions resulted in development of 
the “professional organizer” and “political process” models. The “professional organizer” 
model allows for the involvement of external “elite” groups and agents who provide a 
majority of the leadership and resources required by social movement organizations.18 
The “political process” emphasizes the internal capacity of a minority community to 
generate and maintain social movement organizations while elites provide support 
                                                 
15 Harvey Waterman, “Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative and 
Historical Perspective.” World Politics, Volume 32 (1981): 554–589. 
16 Pichardo, “Resource Mobilization,” 99. 
17 Ibid. 
18 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalism 
and Resource Mobilization (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Corporation, 1973). 
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services to that social movement for their own self-interests.19 A critical consideration on 
the formation and maintenance of a social movement then becomes whether a particular 
social movement is supported by a natural base from within the community. If it is 
supported by a natural base, the involvement of elites will most likely be in a supportive 
capacity rather than as a requirement. If not supported by a natural base, the involvement 
of elites will be a requirement and will impact the movement based on the motivation of 
the elites, which may be out of sincere concern in the “professional organizer” model or 
in order to contain, control, or profit from the social movement in the “political process” 
model.  
There are ten issues which have emerged that have challenged the empirical 
generalizations of, aspects of collective action ignored by, or core assumptions of 
Resource Mobilization Theory. These include the downplaying of specific grievances, 
marginalization of ideology, bias towards formal organizations, the level and method of 
collective action analysis, deviations of individuals from personalities inherent to rational 
choice theory, and a lack of consideration of collective identity or movement diversity.20 
Another criticism is that Resource Mobilization Theory inappropriately normalizes 
collective behavior, by emphasizing the similarity between conventional behavior and 
protest behavior, and is unable to explain non-normative collective actions, such as 
disorder and rebellion.21 
2. Social Identity Theory 
The second theory that will be applied to the Southwest Hispanic Community and 
pressures upon that community is Social Identity Theory.22 The advent of Social Identity 
Theory is widely attributed to Henri Tajfel and his work in the late 1970s. According to 
Social Identity theory, the three internal criteria for “group identification” are a cognitive 
                                                 
19 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982); J. Craig Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Workers’ 
Movement in the 1960s (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1985).  
20 Buechler, “Beyond Resource Mobilization?,” 221–231. 
21 Piven and Cloward, “Collective Protest.”  
22 Henri Tajfel, “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.” Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 
33 (1982): 1–39. 
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awareness of membership, an evaluation of the value of membership, and an emotional 
investment in the awareness and evaluation.23 Social identity is defined as that part of the 
individuals’ self-concept that derives from their knowledge of their membership of a 
social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that 
membership.24 
There are five basic tenets generally recognized as the foundations of Social 
Identity Theory that provide substantial and specific premises while leaving room for 
cultural variations: 
- Identity Motivation – Individuals are motivated to achieve a positive and 
distinct identity. The minimal group paradigm provides strong evidence 
that just about any criterion for social categorization can be used by group 
members to construct a positive and distinct identity for themselves.25 
- Centrality of Social Identity – The need for a positive and distinct identity 
will lead individuals to want to belong to groups that enable their members 
to fulfill their identity needs.26 If a group fails to add positive values to the 
individual’s sense of who he/she is, there is no reason to join or remain a 
member/supporter.27 
- Assessing Social Identity Through Social Comparisons – We come to 
understand our own situations by comparing ourselves with others. The 
nature of the social comparisons we make are influenced by both our 
perceptions of our group memberships and the particular group goals we 
adopt.28 
                                                 
23 Henri Tajfel, “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.” Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 
33 (1982): 1–39. 
24 Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), 255. 
25 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 94.  
26 Ibid., 99. 
27 Anders Strindberg, “Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism,” Working Paper, 2011.  
28 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 96.  
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- Availability of Cognitive Alternatives – The thoughts and actions of 
groups dissatisfied with their social identity are based on whether the 
present situation is perceived as stable and legitimate.29  
- Strategies for Improving Social Identity – minority group members who 
perceive their social identity to be inadequate will employ various 
strategies to improve their situation. These include normative 
individualistic options to non-normative collective options. Individualistic 
strategies include making intra-group comparisons, trying to move up 
individually to a higher status group, or redefining in-group characteristics 
as positive. Such strategies do not alter the inter-group balance of power. 
Collective strategies do alter the inter-group balanced of power. Strategies 
include directly challenging the majority group to change inter-group 
power relations.30 
Within Social Identity Theory, the social group is seen to function as a provider of 
positive social identity for its members through comparing itself, and distinguishing 
itself, from other comparison groups along salient dimensions, which have clear value 
differential.31 In effect, there can be no intergroup behavior without categorization into 
groups and research on intergroup behavior has shown that when these categorizations 
occur intra-group differences are minimized while inter-group differences are 
exaggerated. Additionally, the minimal group paradigm influences categorization, as 
people can be and are classified into distinct groups based on arbitrary and trivial 
criteria.32 
Social Identity Theory aids our understanding of intergroup conflict as the process 
of categorization into groups and evaluations of those groups is “a challenge for members 
of stigmatized, negatively valued groups, who may attempt to dissociate themselves, to 
                                                 
29 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 97.  
30 Ibid., 98.  
31 Barry Commins and John Lockwood, “The Effects of Status Differences, Favored Treatment, and 
Equity on Intergroup Comparisons,” European Journal of Social Psychology, Volume 9 (1979): 281–282. 
32 Judith Howard, “Social Psychology of Identities,” Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 26 (2000): 
369.  
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evaluate the distinguishing dimensions of in-groups as less negative, to rate their in-group 
as more favorable on other dimensions, or to compete directly with the out-group to 
produce changes in the status of the groups.”33 Put more succinctly, when the identities 
and associated political interests of one group clash with those of another group, the 
result can be political conflict, including insurgency and terrorist violence.34 
A significant body of professional work that extends the concepts of Social 
Identity Theory first presented by Tajfel and Turner has been authored or coauthored by 
Michael Hogg in the mid-1990s and through early 2000.35 Some of that work has sought 
to elaborate on the concepts of how self-categorization results in group behavior, which 
provides additional insight into the application of social identity theory, such as 
motivation for uncertainty reduction and prototype-based depersonalization.  
C. HISPANIC COMMUNITY IDENTITY AND STATUS 
There is a wealth of information related to the sociocultural, economic, and 
political status and identity of Southwest Hispanic Community. The U.S. Census Bureau 
compiles many statistical measures as do other nongovernmental organizations like the 
Pew Hispanic Center. The statistical data is collected, analyzed, and disseminated using a 
wide array of variables and descriptors, with two of the more common being “race” and 
“ethnicity.” Race can be defined as an arbitrary classification of modern humans based on 
any, or a combination of, various physical characteristics, such as skin color, facial form, 
                                                 
33 Judith Howard, “Social Psychology of Identities,” Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 26 (2000): 
369.  
34 Strindberg, “Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism.” 
35 Michael A. Hogg, The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction to Social 
Identity (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992); Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. 
White, “A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory,” 
Social Psychology Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 4 (December, 1995): 255–269; Barbara-Ann Mullin and 
Michael A. Hogg, “Dimensions of Subjective Uncertainty in Social Identification and Minimal Intergroup 
Discrimination,” British Journal of Social Psychology, Volume 37 (1998): 345–365; Michael A. Hogg and 
Sarah C. Hains, “Friendship and Group Identification: A New Look at the Role of Cohesiveness in 
Groupthink,” European Journal of Social Psychology, Volume 28 (1998): 323–341; Michael A. Hogg and 
Cecilia L. Ridgeway, “Social Identity: Sociological and Social Psychological Perspectives,” Social 
Psychology Quarterly, Volume 66, Number 2 (June 2003): 97–100. Michael A. Hogg, Dominic Abrams, 
Sabine Otten, and Steve Hinkle, “The Social Identity Perspective: Intergroup Relations, Self-Conception, 
and Small Groups,” Small Group Research, Volume 35, Number 3 (June, 2004): 246–276.  
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or eye shape, and now frequently based on such genetic markers as blood groups.36 
Ethnicity refers to an identity with or membership in a particular racial, national, or 
cultural group and observance of that group’s customs, beliefs, and language.37 Culture, 
as it pertains to ethnicity, can be misunderstood or misused, so for the purposes of this 
thesis, will be defined as the sum of attitudes, customs, and beliefs that distinguishes one 
group of people from another. Culture is transmitted, through language, material objects, 
ritual, institutions and art, from one generation to the next.38 Reduced to their most basic 
elements, it can be said that race is based on physical differences while ethnicity is based 
on sociocultural differences. The definition and usage of terms, as described above, are 
important as they pertain to the appropriateness of the available data. Racial differences, 
while an important aspect of social identity, will not be examined within this paper, 
which instead considers the impact of ethnic differences.  
When the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 94–311 in 1976 requiring that federal 
government agencies categorize and collect data on Hispanics, it was the first and only 
time in the nation’s history that an ethnic group had been singled out in this manner.39 
Government agencies also collect data on whites, blacks and Asian-Americans, but 
unlike Hispanics, they are all categorized by the U.S. Census Bureau as racial groups. 
Hispanics and Latinos are categorized as an ethnic group—meaning they share a common 
language, culture and heritage, but not a common race. 
In October of 1997, the Office of Management and Budget accepted 
recommendations from the “Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and 
Ethnic Standards” that revised standards for classification of federal data on race and 
ethnicity. The revised standards included five minimum categories for data on race: 
American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian 
                                                 
36 Dictionary.com Unabridged, s.v. “race,” accessed October 7, 2012, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/race. 
37 The American Heritage® New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition, s.v. “ethnicity,” 
accessed October 7, 2012, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ethnicity. 
38 The American Heritage® New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition. s.v. “culture” 
accessed October 7, 2012, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/culture. 
39 Ruben Rumbaut, Hispanics and the Future or America, ed. Marta Tienda and Faith Mitchell 
(Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2006), 36–65. 
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or Other Pacific Islander, and White. The standards also included two categories for data 
on ethnicity as either “Hispanic or Latino” or “Not Hispanic or Latino.”40 
The revised standards recognized regional differences in the usage of the terms 
“Hispanic” and “Latino,” which contributed to OMB’s decision to recognize both 
identities in their terminology to improve response rates. OMB’s usage of the term 
“Hispanic or Latino” refers to a “person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, South 
or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.41 
Quantitative data and qualitative analysis from the U.S. Census Bureau and the 
Pew Hispanic Center were particularly useful sources of information relevant to the 
primary research question. Information related to sociocultural, economic, and political 
wellbeing at the state, regional and national level was readily available but had to be 
reorganized and recalculated to capture factors and influences specific to the Southwest 
region. The primary need for the reorganization was based on the fact that the U.S. 
Census Bureau does not analyze data for the Southwest region. Data for six of the states 
included in a broad definition of the Southwest are included in the West region and the 
remaining two states are included in the South region. The regional organization is an 
important consideration as cumulative effects of including California, Texas, Arizona, 
and Mexico within a single region indicate a magnification of disparity in a number of 
community indicators.  
D.  NATIONAL PRESSURES AFFECTING HISPANIC COMMUNITY 
Civil rights advocacy and public policy groups and research organizations provide 
a seemingly inexhaustible source of information regarding pressures exerted internally or 
externally upon particular communities and the potential impacts of those pressures. 
Particularly relevant to this thesis is information and analysis from National Council of 
La Raza (NCLR), self-described as the largest national Hispanic civil rights and 
advocacy organization in the United States, which conducts applied research, policy 
                                                 
40 Office of Management and Budget, “Revisions to the Standards.”  
41 Ibid. 
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analysis, and advocacy to provide a Latino perspective for key areas of 
assets/investments, civil rights/immigration, education, employment and economic status, 
and health. Another excellent source of information is the Pew Hispanic Center, which 
identifies itself as a nonpartisan research organization that seeks to improve 
understanding of the U.S. Hispanic population and to chronicle Latinos’ growing impact 
on the nation.42 Other organizations that collect, analyze, and publish relevant and often 
contentious or contradictory information are the Center for Immigration Studies, 
Federation for American Immigration Reform, and the Cato Institute; however, some of 
these organizations collect data more relevant to the non-Hispanic community, and 
therefore, was of limited value to the primary research question being considered.  
With regards to literature describing pressures specific to the Southwest Hispanic 
Community, a first impression is made by the rhetoric used by various organizations on 
either side of an issue. Frequently uncivil and often derogatory or defamatory in nature, 
the rhetoric tends to paint the “other” organizations as overly leftist, rightist, or racist in 
an apparent attempt to discredit either the positions or information presented by that 
organization. An excellent example is the English Only organization ProEnglish, which 
was founded, among other organizations, by John Tanton.43 ProEnglish has not been 
designated as a hate group by Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC); however, other 
organizations founded by John Tanton have.44 The designation of other organizations 
founded by John Tanton as hate groups, which are often cited in articles aimed at 
ProEnglish specifically.45 It should also be noted that designation as a “hate group” by 
                                                 
42 “About the Center,” Pew Hispanic Center, accessed July 11, 2012, 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/about-the-center/. 
43  “The Board of Directors,” ProEnglish, accessed July 15, 2012, http://www.proenglish.org/about-
us/the-board.html.  
44 “John Tanton’s Network,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed July 15, 2012, 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2002/summer/the-
puppeteer/john-tantons-network. 
45 “Controversy Ahead of House Hearing on GOP’s ‘English Only’ Bill,” TPM Muckraker, accessed 
August 9, 2012, 
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/08/steve_king_english_only_proenglish.php.  
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SPLC is in itself controversial, as conservative organizations point to a perceived 
preference for designating rightist groups as a hate group.46  
With these considerations in mind, literature that attempts to remain clear of such 
rhetoric, accusations, or preferences is more difficult to find but much more valuable. The 
Pew Hispanic Center again proved to be a valuable source of information, which was 
more objective in nature relative to other available sources. A number of polls by the Pew 
Hispanic Center, which are supported by other polls, indicate that Hispanics are more 
concerned with the availability of healthcare, economic uncertainty and unemployment, 
immigration enforcement, and educational opportunities.47 Concern for most of those 
issues is shared with the non-Hispanic community in general, but the issues of 
immigration enforcement and language usage, which underlies a number of general 
concerns, have a unique and specific impact on the Hispanic community.  
1. Immigration Enforcement and Prosecutorial Discretion 
Through a merger of the investigative and interior enforcement elements of the 
U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) was created in 2003 as the principle investigative agency of 
the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (ICE 2011). ICE’s central 
responsibility is to enforce the nation’s civil immigration laws in coordination with U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS).48 Although it represents an ability to remove the largest amount of aliens since  
 
                                                 
46 “Is the Family Research Council Really a Hate Group?” The Daily Beast, accessed on August 17, 
2012,  http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/16/is-the-family-research-council-really-a-hate-
group.html. 
47 Mark H. Lopez, Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, and Seth Motel, As Deportations Rise to Record Levels, 
Most Latinos Oppose Obama’s Policy (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2011), 26; “Hispanic 
Voters Put Other Issues Before Immigration,” Gallup, accessed on July 9, 2012, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/155327/hispanic-voters-put-issues-immigration.aspx.  
48 Memorandum by John Morton, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil 
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of 
Aliens,” Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 17 June 2011, 2. 
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1892,49 ICE only has resources to remove approximately 400,000 aliens each year,50 
which is much less than the 10.8 million unauthorized immigrants DHS estimates to be 
living in the U.S. as of January 2010.51 Limited availability of resources led to the 
issuance of directives by ICE52 (to exercise prosecutorial discretion and prioritize alien 
removal based on list of factors to consider when exercising prosecutorial discretion. By 
adhering to established priorities and exercising prosecutorial discretion, ICE leadership 
attempts to focus limited resources on individuals posing a risk to national security or 
public safety.  
Threats to national security are posed by aliens engaged in or suspected of 
terrorism or espionage, or who otherwise pose a danger to national security. Those aliens 
posing a risk to public safety are defined as those convicted of crimes, with Level I and 
Level 2 offenders receiving principal attention. Level I offenders are those aliens 
convicted of “aggravated felonies” or two or more “felonies” each punishable by more 
than one year of confinement. Level 2 offenders are those aliens convicted of any felony 
or three or more “misdemeanors” each punishable by less than one year of confinement. 
These priorities are also applicable to the Secure Communities program to identify and 
remove criminal aliens. Second priority is given to aliens who have recently violated 
immigration controls at the border, ports of entry, or through the knowing abuse of the 
visa and visa waiver programs. Third priority is the removal of aliens who are subject to a 
final order of removal and abscond, fail to depart, or intentionally obstruct immigration 
controls.53  
                                                 
49 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010 (Washington, 
D.C: Office of Immigration Statistics, 2011), 94. 
50 Memorandum by John Morton, “Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, 
Detention, and Removal of Aliens,” Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement,  2 March 2011, 1. 
51 Michael Hoffer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, Estimate of the Unauthorized Immigrant 
Population Residing in the United States: January 2010 (Washington, DC: Office of Immigration 
Statistics, 2011), 1. 
52 Morton, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion,” Morton, “Civil Immigration Enforcement.” 
53 Morton, “Civil Immigration Enforcement,” 2.  
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The 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) limited the 
authority of immigration judges to provide relief from removal, which increased attention 
on the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.54 While prosecutorial discretion itself is not a new concept, the use of 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement was institutionalized within the INS 
in 1999 and 2000. The recent direction issued by Director John Morton of ICE, to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion in order to prioritize the use of limited immigration 
enforcement resources has renewed attention of this practice. 
Bo Cooper, General Counsel for INS, found that “Prosecutorial discretion is a 
decision by an individual or law enforcement agency charged with enforcing a law to 
enforce—or not to enforce—the law against someone.”55 One example of prosecutorial 
discretion is a decision, absent statutory, national security, public safety threat, or other 
requirements, to forgo making an administrative arrest or custody determination for 
aliens who are nursing mothers.56 It is important that, as stated, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion is not limited to prosecutors but includes immigration 
investigators and agents that are charged with enforcing immigration law. The concept of 
prosecutorial discretion is intended to prevent “over criminalization” due to existing 
statutes society does not wish to enforce, account for limitations in enforcement resources 
making it impossible to prosecute all offenses, and address equities of individual cases 
that rigid application of broad statutes cannot do.57 
Prosecutorial discretion is limited to the decision to enforce, or not enforce, a 
particular law and cannot be an “affirmative act of approval, or grant of a benefit, under a 
statute or other applicable law that sets guidelines for determining when the approval 
                                                 
54 Memorandum by Doris Meissner, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion,” Department of Justice, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 17 November 2000, 1. 
55 Memorandum by Bo Cooper, “INS Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion,” Department of Justice, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 4 October 1999, 2. 
56 Memorandum by Julie L. Meyers, “Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion,” Department of 
Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 7 November 2007, 1. 
57 Ibid., 2. 
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should be given.”58 For example, the inspection and admission of aliens, at a port-of-
entry, involves elements of both enforcement and benefit adjudication. In that case, 
admitting an otherwise inadmissible alien with an authorized status and length of stay is 
an affirmative action is not a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion.59 In some cases, 
the distinction between an enforcement decision and an affirmative act of approval is 
often blurred,60 as the decision to not enforce a law can lead to the granting of benefits. 
An example would be a decision not to place an alien currently in the United States into 
removal proceedings, which results in an ongoing violation of the law, and in some cases 
lead to an adjustment of status and granting of benefits.61 The result is that otherwise 
removable aliens remain in an ambiguous and uncertain status.  
The Supreme Court has ruled that there is a presumption that decisions to 
exercise, or not exercise, prosecutorial discretion are not reviewable by the courts under 
the Administrative Procedures Act.62 In practice this ruling has two effects. The first is 
that prosecutorial discretion does not require equal enforcement, or non-enforcement, in 
the case of two individuals with similar circumstances. In those cases, the person who 
was selected for prosecution cannot have their case reviewed, or force prosecution on an 
individual not selected for prosecution, on the basis of being improperly singled out for 
prosecution.63 The second effect is that absent a clear exception, the decision to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion to not enforce a particular law cannot be questioned by those 
without standing to enforce that law. It is possible another individual, with prosecutorial 
authority, can decide to prosecute but someone without prosecutorial authority cannot 
question the decision through the judicial system to force prosecution. The limited 
exceptions include situations where equal protection under the constitution has not been 
                                                 
58 Memorandum by Julie L. Meyers, “Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion,” Department of 
Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 7 November 2007, 4.  
59 Ibid., 9. 
60 Ibid., 5. 
61 Ibid., 10. 
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provided,64 and where statutes, or the law enforcement agency itself, have provided clear 
guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers.65  
2. Language Usage 
Language as a keystone for social identity is exemplified by Berger and 
Luckmann’s contention that human “knowledge” is developed, transmitted and 
maintained in social situations, and that the sociology of knowledge must seek to 
understand the process by which knowledge comes to be socially established as 
“reality.”66 
They point to three foundations of knowledge in everyday life as reality, social 
interaction, and language.67 The first foundation of reality may seem difficult in the 
abstract but is more easily understood when we consider that the reality we face is the 
foundation of our knowledge, as we must recognize and adapt to that reality on a daily 
basis. That knowledge of reality would be different for each person in the absolute 
absence of social interaction, and the availability of a common language should social 
interaction even be possible. It then becomes clearer that knowledge within society is 
based on the extent of social interaction and the ability to share reality through a 
commonly understood language. This concept of reality, social interaction, and language 
gains importance when one considers the different realities of everyday life, extent of 
social interaction, and existence of a common language between the Southwest Hispanic 
Community and the remainder of the Southwest Community.   
Berger and Luckmann further stated that language is the most important sign 
system of human society, as it essential for the understanding of the reality of everyday 
life. It is used in face-to-face discussion but is not confined to those situations as it is used 
to “speak” across distances through audio or written communications. Language is also 
                                                 
64 Memorandum by Julie L. Meyers, “Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion,” Department of 
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65 Ibid., 5 and 8. 
66 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York, NY: 
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67 Ibid., 19–46. 
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able to “speak” across the ages enabling us to communicate (albeit one way) with future 
generations as past generations can communicate with us via similar methods. It also 
enables us to “speak” across experiences enabling us to be part of events that we may not 
ever partake in.68 Consider written accounts of explorers who have stepped on the moon 
or reached either the North or South pole, which are experiences that take on meaning 
and form a part of our socially constructed knowledge as a result of language. 
These concepts gain importance when applied to the Southwest Hispanic 
Community, as they help to understand the impact language usage has on that 
community. Two interesting language usage pressures revealed by the literature are the 
English Only movement as an external pressure and the negative identity formed by non-
Spanish speaking Hispanics, which is an internal pressure.   
E. HOMELAND SECURITY 
A review of the literature on homeland security reveals there are many meanings 
and connotations for related terms, which often vary and even conflict between and 
among various public and private entities. To alleviate complications as a result of these 
variances and conflicts, “homeland security” will be derived from the 2010 National 
Security Strategy69 and broadly defined as the adaptation of traditional and historic 
functions of government and society, such as civil defense, emergency response, law 
enforcement, customs, border patrol, and immigration to confront new threats and 
evolving hazards by identifying and interdicting hostile actors within our borders, 
maintaining effective control of physical borders, and disrupting or dismantling 
transnational terrorist and criminal organizations. This definition allows for a broad and 
objective review of hazards and threats that have the potential to emerge within our 
borders to include.  
                                                 
68 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York, NY: 
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69 Office of the White House, National Security Strategy: May 2010 (Washington, DC: Office of the 
White House, 2010), 14. 
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Within the homeland security enterprise, particular attention is paid to the issues 
of radicalization, insurgency, and terrorism although usage and definitions also vary 
widely in homeland security literature. Thus, a “line in the sand” with regards to 
terminology usage will be drawn for the purposes of this particular research.  
Applying the term specific to Islamic radicalization, Marc Sageman defines 
radicalization as “the process of transformation from ordinary individual into a terrorist 
willing to kill and sacrifice life. Radicalization has four prongs: A sense of moral outrage 
for events locally and globally, this outrage is then interpreted in a specific way—namely 
Islam. This ideology appeals to certain people because it resonates with their personal 
experience of discrimination and makes them feel they are part of the larger war. A few 
of these individuals are then mobilized through networks both face-to-face and online to 
become a terrorist.”70 
Bruce Hoffman, particularly his definitions of “insurgency” and “terrorism,” is 
widely cited within homeland security literature. He defines insurgency as containing 
irregular military tactics that characterize guerrilla operations and typically involve 
coordinated informational and psychological warfare efforts designed to mobilize popular 
support against a national government, imperialist power, or foreign occupying force.71 
He also defines terrorism “as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through 
violence—or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”72  
It is within these specific definitions and usage that the terms homeland security, 
radicalization, insurgency, and terrorism will be used to examine the primary research 
question.  
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72 Ibid., 40. 
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III. INTERGROUP RELATION THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For this particular research, Resource Mobilization Theory and Social Identity 
Theory provide the filter through which the status of and pressure upon the Southwest 
Hispanic Community will be examined. It is recognized that there are a number of 
theories that may be applied to a community of interest, such as Relative Deprivation 
Theory or Terror Management Theory, however Resource Mobilization Theory and 
Social Identity Theory were selected to allow for an examination of how and why social 
movements may emerge with a potential for conflict between Hispanics and non-
Hispanics. It is believed that the materialist and identity themes inherent in each theory 
would prove to be complementary themes that are both relevant and appropriate to the 
research. Additionally, the concept of identity as a resource should be considered as a 
link between the two theories. The following sections are intended to increase 
familiarization with the two theories as they relate specifically to the Southwest Hispanic 
Community. A more comprehensive and focused understanding of those theories allows 
the sociocultural, economic, and political status of and certain pressures upon the 
community to be examined within the necessary context.  
B. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY 
Resource Mobilization Theory equates social movement behavior with political 
behavior.73 The general model posits the existence of a polity structure composed of 
groups that have regular, routine, and low-cost access to societal resources. Excluded 
groups are denied this ready access and strive for inclusion to the polity to gain such 
privileges. Hence, the model depicts a dynamic and interactive struggle between the out-
polity groups who seek inclusion and the in-polity groups who resist such incursions.74 
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Two dominant models are the “professional organizer” and “political process” 
models, which are largely determined by resource availability, motivation, and the 
political environment. In the “professional organizer” model, McCarthy and Zald point to 
the involvement of whites (foundations, churches, corporations, and government) in the 
formation of civil rights organizations for the provision of money, manpower, skills, and 
leadership.75 In the “political process” model, McAdam pointed towards certain 
socioeconomic processes that allowed the black community to organize to a limited 
extent which was independent of the intervention of external agents.76 Relative to the 
Southwest Hispanic Community, a major consideration appears to be whether community 
resources (leadership, organizing, technical, and financial) would allow an oppressed 
group to develop and sustain an internally generated organization, or if external resources 
would be required and/or be made available.  
Within the political process model, the motivation for “elite” or outside 
involvement is presented as a method to control, contain, or profit from the social 
movement. The professional organizer model suggested by McCarthy and Zald presents 
elites as willing, even aggressive, sponsors of social insurgency who are motivated out of 
a sincere sense of social conscience. The political process model takes a more pessimistic 
view of elite participation, as all social movements pose a threat to existing institutional 
arrangements in society.77 Therefore, it is unlikely that members would act sincerely to 
promote insurgent challenges to existing social arrangements that arise out of the 
movements. Instead, elite involvement would occur only as a response to the threat posed 
by the generation of a mass-based social movement.78 It should be noted that rather than 
being mutually exclusive, the professional organizer and political process models could 
conceivably be contained within a particular social movement and may complement or be 
detrimental to the main effort. 
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Political environment is of central importance to the political process model as the 
alignment of political groups and the susceptibility of the social structure to the efforts of 
social movements is a crucial element. Political environment is not as crucial in the 
professional organizer model as the important variable is simply the infusion of resources 
to support social movements. The assumptions in the professional organizer model are 
that elites will be aligned with and will support the social movement out of sincere desire. 
To put it simply, if there is a natural social base with significant resources, the 
professional organizer model will likely dominate and movement autonomy will be 
assured as elites support the movement out of sincere concern. If there is no natural social 
base for the movement or inadequate resources, the political process model will likely 
dominate and the potential for movements to be appropriated is increased as elite provide 
support out of self interest. For this reason, the status of the Southwest Hispanic 
Community, particularly those factors indicative of economic and political resource 
availability, is an important consideration. Under Resource Mobilization Theory, the 
availability of resources will not only determine whether a social movement can be 
formed and maintained, but whether that movement will be preempted or allowed to 
proceed as intended by those aggrieved.  
C. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 
Social Identity Theory can be looked at as a means with which to understand and 
examine intergroup actions as they compete for resources. In that regards, it is a valuable 
tool with which to examine intergroup behaviors between the Southwest Hispanic 
Community and the non-Hispanic community, as Social Identity Theory can be used to 
predict the types and degrees of intergroup bias, such as those between those 
communities. The same processes that govern intergroup competition and conflict can 
also be seen between Spanish speaking Hispanics and non-Spanish speaking Hispanics 
and is readily explained by the minimal group paradigm that allows for categorization on 
the basis of the most trivial characteristics.  
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Group Identification is one of the foundational concepts of Social Identity Theory 
and is based on the existence of the following three components:79 
- Cognitive – A sense of awareness of membership. 
- Evaluative – Awareness is related to some value connotation. 
- Emotional -  Investment in the awareness and evaluation. 
Group identification or categorization will occur when there is an awareness of 
membership in which an individual attributes value to that membership and is invested in 
that awareness and evaluation. Judith Howard discussed a relevant finding regarding an 
individual’s preference for adopting racial and ethnic identities.80 Howard noted that 
Hispanics who are African-American or Asian will not typically identify with their 
Hispanic group while some White people will readily adopt a Hispanic identity. This 
finding points to categorizations based on different valuations that have been applied to 
racial-ethnic distinctions. In general, it also indicates a positive connotation for cultural 
distinction, although the exception seems to be non-Spanish speaking Hispanics who 
attribute a negative connotation to the group identity, as will be shown in future sections.  
Tajfel concluded that an individual’s sense of worth is significantly influenced by 
group membership(s) and by the process of making comparisons with relevant out-
groups.81 Thus, an individual readily takes action to improve the positive identity of their 
group at the expense of out-groups. Various studies have been conducted that have 
revealed group identification has lead to bias and favoritism towards the in-group. One 
such study led Tajfel to conclude that intergroup conflict was inevitable when group 
goals were mutually exclusive.82 This result indicated that in conditions where groups are 
directly competing for resources, individuals reflected a bias towards their group and 
embraced strategies that showed favoritism towards their group. Tajfel further found that 
the very act of allocating people to groups, even on fairly trivial grounds, was an essential 
                                                 
79 Tajfel, “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.” 
80 Howard, “Social Psychology of Identities.” 
81 Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories. 
82 Ibid. 
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ingredient leading to intergroup discriminations.83 As applied to the primary research 
question, we can understand how Hispanics and non-Hispanics can be categorized into 
their respective groups on the basis of sociocultural, economic, or even political traits 
regardless of how minor.  
D. RADICALIZATION 
The “staircase to terrorism,” summarized here, provides a useful method for 
visualizing the radicalization process that an individual may experience as a result of a 
negative social identity. This particular method can be applied consistently across all 
cultures in that everyone begins on the ground floor, although there are cross-cultural 
differences captured by the amount of time to travel from one floor to another, the 
importance of each floor, and salience of psychological processes characteristic of each 
floor. As an individual climbs the staircase, fewer choices are available with the final 
outcome being the destruction of the individual, others, or both.84 
All people from all cultures start on the ground floor. The important consideration 
for understanding the “ground floor” is how people subjectively interpret their personal 
and collective identities and situations, in lieu of objective or actual interpretations. Even 
though many may have developed one or more negative social identities, the existence of 
a more dominant positive social identities will induce the vast majority to remain on the 
ground floor. Those individuals with a dominant negative social identities and feel the 
need to improve their living conditions, find greater justice, or establish a more positive 
individual identity may exit the ground floor by climbing the stairs.85 
Some individuals may experience increasingly intense feelings of shame and 
anger, as they perceive they have no voice in decisions that impact their lives or are 
denied the ability to improve their situation.86 Those feelings of shame, similar to those 
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85 Ibid., 45–58. 
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expressed previously in this paper, and an inability to take advantage of opportunities to 
exit the staircase on the first floor, may cause an even smaller number of individuals to 
climb the “staircase to terrorism” to the second floor. 
Displacement of aggression on an out-group is an important aspect of the 
environment on the second floor as feelings of frustration, dissatisfaction, and anger 
increase. By displacing negative feelings onto an out-group, the leaders of the in-group 
are able to build group cohesion, silence dissenters, increase support for their leadership, 
and group member sentiments allow for more aggressive postures towards out-groups.87 
On the third floor, radicalization continues with categorization of the out-group as 
different, unclean, and corrupt while adopting beliefs that would justify further actions 
through affiliation, increasing secrecy, isolation, and fear.88 The inadequate identity and 
severe sense of dissatisfaction that lead individuals to climb to the third floor is 
transformed into a morality that justifies an “us” versus “them” morality. 
An individual enters the secret world of terrorist organizations on the fourth floor 
with an evolved identity with a morality that justifies killing others to find fulfillment and 
meaning. Specialized training is provided at this level before proceeding to the fifth floor 
where a terrorist act is executed.89 
E. ANALYSIS 
Resource Mobilization Theory is concerned with the resources that are available 
to allow a social movement to form and be maintained. As a result, application of theory 
relies less on particular grievances, as it generally assumes grievances of one form or 
another to exist, and more on resources internal to an aggrieved group and whether or not 
external resources will be necessary. When resources from external sources are required, 
there is the potential for the movement to be contained, controlled, or used for provide by 
external organizations. Resource availability for the Southwest Hispanic Community, 
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88 Ibid., 83–96.  
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relative to the non-Hispanic community, is therefore found to be an important 
determinant for social movement organization and success.  
Social Identity Theory is more concerned with the reasons a social movement is 
formed and maintained rather than resource availability. Due to individual and collective 
categorizations, relative comparisons between those identities and the need to maintain 
positive social identities, an individual or group with a negative identity may employ 
strategies to develop a positive identity. Such strategies may be relatively benign, such as 
an individual learning another language, or in extreme circumstances result in conflict 
through radicalization to insurgency or terrorism. Therefore, a specific community may 
be examined to reveal whether a negative identity may exist as a result of that 
community’s status or pressures exerted upon and from within that community. However, 
it must be noted that the existent of a negative identity will not necessarily lead to 
extremist behavior. 
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IV. HISPANIC COMMUNITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As sociocultural, economic, and political factors impact both categorization and 
creation of a positive and distinct social identity, it is necessary to understand the current 
status of the Southwest Hispanic community relative to the non-Hispanic community. 
Additionally, the social and economic factors are important considerations with regards 
to Resource Mobilization Theory, as they pertain to the capacity for mobilization and 
how that mobilization may occur. The following sections present factors that appear 
relevant to the primary research question. Unless noted otherwise, data in these sections 
has been obtained or derived from the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) 
collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.90 
The Hispanic population in the eight Southwestern states account for a majority 
share of the total U.S. Hispanic population and is comprised of native born citizens, 
foreign born citizens, and foreign born noncitizens. One of three residents in the 
Southwest is Hispanic of which a vast majority is of Mexican origin with the remainder 
being mostly of Central and South American origin. Population projections have 
historically indicated that the Hispanic community, already the largest minority, 
continues to grow at a fast rate. However, recent trends have revealed that net 
immigration between the U.S. and Mexico may have stalled, although the higher fertility 
rate of Hispanics will likely continue to increase their share of the total population.  
While the Hispanic population has and continues to grow sociocultural, economic, 
and political comparisons between Hispanics and non-Hispanics, this indicates 
continuing and significant gaps between the two communities. Median household income 
is significantly less for Hispanics with the impacts being magnified by a higher 
                                                 
90 Data was obtained from U.S. Census Bureau “American Factfinder,” which can be accessed at 
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household size. Language usage, education attainment, home ownership, and poverty 
rates also indicate that Hispanics lag significantly behind non-Hispanics in other social 
and economic indicators. Finally, the Hispanic community appears to be politically 
underrepresented within Congress due to the relative lack of Hispanic members.  
B. SOCIOCULTURAL STATUS 
1. Current Population 
The 2010 ACS data shows the total U.S. population is estimated at 309 Million, 
of which 85 Million live in the eight Southwestern states (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.   Hispanic/Non-Hispanic Population - National and Regional 
Hispanics make up 16.4% of the total U.S. population; however, the proportion of 




Figure 2.   Ethnic Concentration – National and Regional 
Of the eight Southwest states the three states with higher regional concentrations 
of Hispanics are New Mexico (46.4%), Texas (37.7%), and California (37.7%) (Figure 
3). The five states with lower regional concentrations of Hispanics are Arizona (29.8%), 
Nevada (26.6%), Colorado (20.8%), Utah (13.0%), and Oklahoma (8.8%) (Figure 3). It is 
also notable that the only two Southwestern states with concentrations of Hispanics that 
are lower than the national proportion of 16.4% are Oklahoma and Utah. 
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U.S. Southwest NM TX CA AZ NV CO UT OK
Not Hispanic 83.6% 66.1% 53.6% 62.3% 62.3% 70.2% 73.4% 79.2% 87.0% 91.2%
Hispanic 16.4% 33.9% 46.4% 37.7% 37.7% 29.8% 26.6% 20.8% 13.0% 8.8%
Ethnic Concentration - Southwest States
 
Figure 3.   Ethnic Concentration - Southwest States 
Significantly, the data shows that slightly more than half of the nearly 50.1 
million Hispanics living in the U.S. reside in the three Southwestern states of California 
(27.8%), Texas (18.8%), and Arizona (3.8%) (Figure 4).  





Southwest CA TX AZ
Hispanic 57.1% 27.8% 18.8% 3.8%
Ethnic Distribution - Hispanic Population as a percentage 
of total U.S. Hispanic Population 
 
Figure 4.   Ethnic Distribution - Hispanic Population Centers 
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Data from the Pew Hispanic Center and 2010 Census also indicate a regional 
concentration of Hispanics based on country of origin. Among the 10 largest Hispanic 
origin groups, all have their largest populations in just three states: California (Mexicans, 
Salvadorans and Guatemalans), Florida (Cubans, Colombians, Hondurans and Peruvians) 
or New York (Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Ecuadorians).91 Nationally, Hispanics of 
Mexican origin make up 63.0% of all Hispanics. In the Southwest, the proportion of 
Hispanics of Mexican origin increases to 81.5% with the majority of the remaining 
18.5% coming from Central and South America (Figure 5). The largest single Hispanic 
origin group population in a state is the Mexican population in California at 11.8 million 
people. Texas is home to another 8.4 million Mexicans. Together, these two states 
contain 61% of the total Mexican population in the U.S.92 
 
Figure 5.   Ethnic Concentration - Hispanic Population Country of Origin 
The preceding review of available data reveals that proportions of Hispanic and 
non-Hispanic populations differ significantly from national averages within the 
Southwest region. The data indicates a regional concentration in the Southwest of 
                                                 
91 Seth Motel and Eileen Patten, The 10 Largest Hispanic Origin Groups: Characteristics, Rankings, 
Top Counties (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2012), 13. 
92 Ibid. 
 38 
Hispanics in general and Hispanics of Mexican origin specifically. This data supports a 
conclusion that the Southwest Hispanic community is both separate and distinct from the 
non-Hispanic Community in the Southwest and Hispanic/non-Hispanic Communities 
outside of the Southwest. That conclusion is based upon the larger concentration of 
Hispanics in the Southwest, and the fact that a large proportion of those Hispanics are of 
Mexican origin.  
2. Population Growth 
Past and future trends typically support a view of rapid continued growth of the 
Hispanic community, which is now the largest minority group in the U.S. The Hispanic 
population grew by about 15.5 million people from 2000 to 2010—a 44% increase. In 
2000, there were 35.2 million Hispanics living in the U.S. Today, there are 50.7 million 
Hispanics.93 
Estimates of future growth of the Hispanic population project a rapid increase 
between 1995 and 2025, accounting for 44% of the growth in the U.S. population (32 
million Hispanics out of a total of 72 million persons added to the U.S. population). The 
Hispanic population is the second fastest-growing population, after Asians, in every 
region over the 30-year period.94 Further, the Hispanic population in the U.S. is projected 
to reach 132.8 million in July 2050 and comprise 30% of the nation’s population.95  
The U.S. Census Bureau considers Net International Immigration in their 
population projections, which capture estimates of net migration that includes all foreign-
born immigrants and emigrants, regardless of legal status.96 Thus, unauthorized migrants 
are implicitly included in Census Bureau estimates of net international migration. 
                                                 
93 Seth Motel and Eileen Patten, The 10 Largest Hispanic Origin Groups: Characteristics, Rankings, 
Top Counties (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2012), 15.  
94 Paul R. Campbell, Population Projections for States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 
to 2025, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Division, PPL-47, accessed August 27, 2012, 
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However, it should be noted that the Pew Hispanic Center published a report in April 
2012 that indicates the net immigration between the U.S. and Mexico has come to a 
“standstill” with 1,390,000 migrating from the U.S. to Mexico and 1,370,000 migrating 
from Mexico to the U.S. between June 2005 and June 2010.97 
There are likely a number of factors that have led to the standstill. The Pew 
Hispanic Center report posits that a weakened U.S. job and housing construction market, 
heightened border enforcement, a rise in deportations, growing dangers with illegal 
border crossings, long-term decline in Mexico’s birth rates, and broader economic 
conditions in Mexico have contributed to the standstill.98 
3. Gender Distribution 
The process of radicalization discussed previously can include the separation and 
segregation of males from females due to societal customs or norms. The formation of 
male-only groups, whether based on gender distribution or societal customs, can create 
conformity and obedience within those groups and has the potential to lead to riskier 
moral values and behavior that may be supportive of terrorism (Moghaddam 2006, 96). 
For this reason, the gender distribution was analyzed to determine disparities that might 
be indicative of this dynamic occurring within the Southwest Hispanic Community.  
At the national and regional level, the Hispanic community has more males than 
females, while the distribution is reversed in the non-Hispanic community where females 
outnumber males. The Hispanic population is predominantly male (50.7%) with Hispanic 
males making up 51% of the non-Southwest and 50.5% of the Southwest populations. In 
comparison, the non-Hispanic community is predominantly female (51.1%) with non-
Hispanic females making up 51.2% of the non-Southwest and 50.6% of the Southwest 
populations (Figure 6).  
                                                 
97 Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzales-Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero 
– and Perhaps Less (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center 2012). 
98 Ibid., 6. 
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Figure 6.   Gender Distribution - National and Regional 
The gender disparity is largest between non-Hispanic males and non-Hispanic 
females in the non-Southwest where there are almost 5 million more females than males. 
While the gender disparity is reversed in the Hispanic community outside the Southwest, 
a smaller community size means there are approximately 450,000 more Hispanic males 
than Hispanic females. In the Southwest, there are 260,000 more Hispanic males and 
730,000 more non-Hispanic females.  
The data summarized above does not support a general conclusion that the 
disparities in gender distribution require the separation or segregation into male-only 
groups, as can be seen in other cultures. The numerical dominance of males in the 
Hispanic community might be an important factor in the formation of the Hispanic 
cultural identity, especially in the Southwest where there is increased competition for 
female companions; however, the increase in societal acceptance of inter-ethnic 
relationships will likely forestall radicalization due to numerical inequities based on 
gender. In a society, as in the U.S., where monogamous relationships (dating, as well as 
 41 
marriage) are a generally accepted norm, the ability for Hispanic males to find mates 
among non-Hispanic females will prevent the formation of Hispanic male-only groups.  
4. Age Distribution 
The age distribution of a particular community will impact both identity and 
resource availability. For example, the availability of political resources will be affected 
by the eligibility of community members to vote. The age distribution can also be a factor 
in determining the impact that certain pressures will have upon a community, such as 
when a group will be eligible to draw Medicare or Social Security benefits. A community 
with a greater proportion of members already drawing upon such benefits may be more 
inclined to preserve the ability to draw upon those resources, while a community with a 
lesser proportion eligible to do so may look reduce benefits in the short term in favor of 
preserving such benefits for the future.  
The percentage of Hispanics in the Southwest aged 18 years or older at 65.3% is 
significantly less than the percentage for non-Hispanics at 77.8% (Figure 7). This 
disparity is consistent with those found in the non-Southwest. Additionally, the disparity 
exists for those aged 62 or older (7.3% Hispanic to 18.1% non-Hispanic) and those aged 
65 or older (5.5% Hispanic to 14.5% non-Hispanic), which are the ages where early 
Social Security benefits and Medicare benefits can be accessed respectively.  
 
Figure 7.   Age Distribution - Age 18 and Older 
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Nationally, the median age among Hispanics has risen from 25 in 2000 to 27 in 
2010,99 which corresponds closely with the median age of Hispanics in the Southwest. 
However, the median age of Hispanics in the Southwest at 26.9 is significantly lower 
than the median age for non-Hispanics in the Southwest, which is 39.7 (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8.   Age Distribution - Community Median Age 
The relatively younger age, in terms of both age distribution and median age, of 
Hispanics to non-Hispanics in the Southwest is important as a consideration for any 
issues with an age related component, such as marriage, education attainment, voting 
eligibility, or senior benefits. It can be expected that pressures or policies will elicit 
different reactions based the particular age distribution of the community and their desire 
to maintain access to resources either in the short or long term. 
5. Language Usage 
Usage of Spanish and English by Hispanics and non-Hispanics has broad 
sociocultural impacts due to its foundational basis in the social construction of reality and 
more specifically upon the formation of social identities and categorizations based on  
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those identities. Language usage also has economic and political implications; however, 
the discussion will focus more on the sociocultural impacts given the primary research 
question being considered.  
More than six-in-ten (61%) Hispanic adults in the U.S. say they can carry on a 
conversation in English “very well” or “pretty well.” Among the foreign born or first-
generation Hispanics, 38% say they can carry on a conversation in English. Ninety-two 
percent of Hispanics in the second generation say they are proficient at speaking English. 
The number increases to 96% for third-generation Hispanics100 (Figure 9). At the second 
and higher generations, the number of Hispanics who are English proficient is higher than 
those in the total U.S. population who are English proficient, which is 91%.101  
Another important finding regarding language usage was that the number of 
Hispanic adults who state they are proficient in Spanish decreases significantly for the 
third and higher generations. The percentage of all Hispanics who say they can speak 
Spanish “very well” or “pretty well” is 82%. Ninety-one percent and 82% of the first and 
second generation respectively state they are proficient in speaking Spanish. The number 
of Hispanics that can speak Spanish proficiently drops dramatically to 47% for third and 
higher generations.102 
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Figure 9.   Spanish/English Speaking Ability (adapted from Pew Hispanic Center) 
“First generation” refers to foreign-born people. “Second generation” refers to 
people born in the United States, with at least on first-generation parent. “Third and 
higher generations” refer to people born in the United States, with both parents born in 
the United States.103 The rapid decrease in Spanish usage between second and third 
generation Hispanics, at a time when multiculturalism and diversity are being celebrated 
and valued, has the potential to create a negative positive identity for a large portion of 
the Hispanic community.  
6. Education 
Nationally, the attainment of educational degrees for Hispanics has improved over 
the past 10 years, although it lags the achievements of non-Hispanics (Figure 10). Among 
all Hispanics ages 25 and older, the share with less than a high school diploma is down 
10 percentage points, from 48% in 2000 to 38% in 2010.”104 Additionally, both shares of 
Hispanics with a high school diploma and with a college degree have risen over the past 
decade. Between 2000 and 2010, the share with only a high school diploma increased 
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four percentage points—from 22% to 26%. Similarly, the share with at least a bachelor’s 
degree increased three percentage points during the same period—from 10% to 13%.105 
 
Figure 10.   Education Attainment - National Comparison 
Despite such success, the proportion of Hispanics in the Southwest that achieve a 
high school or higher degree is alarmingly lower at 59.6% than the proportion of non-
Hispanics at 91.3%. Again, we see an instance where a disparity, education attainment in 
this case, between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is greater in the Southwest than the 
disparity seen outside the Southwest (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11.   Education Attainment - Southwest Comparison 
Such a high disparity in educational attainment, regardless of reasons for the 
disparity, will have important and lasting sociocultural and economic impacts upon the 
Southwest Hispanic Community. Education attainment can be considered an important 
factor in the creation of a positive identity when comparisons are made against other 
groups. Additionally, when occupations and income are tied to education attainment, it 
will affect the availability of resources for the formation of social movements.  
7. Household 
The U.S. Census Bureau defines, and tabulates, a “family” household as a family that 
consists of a householder and one or more other people living in the same household who are 
related to the householder by birth, marriage, or adoption. Conversely, a “nonfamily” 
household consists of a householder living alone or with nonrelatives only. Same-sex couple 
households with no relatives of the householder present are tabulated in nonfamily 
households.106 
The ACS data reveals that Hispanics have a greater proportion of family 
households to nonfamily households when compared against non-Hispanics both 
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 47 
nationally and regionally. However, the proportion of family to nonfamily households is 
slightly greater for Hispanics in the Southwest than those in the non-Southwest (Figure 
12). That same dynamic is observed with regards to average family size (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 12.   Household Distribution - Percent “Family” Households 
 
Figure 13.   Household Distribution - Average Family Size 
The greater number of family households, and the larger average family size of 
those households, indicates that the Southwest Hispanic Community favors family units 
over nonfamily units, and therefore, the maintenance of stronger familial bonds. This 
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conclusion is supported by data that shows that Hispanics have a divorce rate that is 
significantly less than non-Hispanic households. However, that data is contrasted by the 
lower percentage of Hispanics who have never been married than non-Hispanics. These 
dynamics may be explained in part by the lower income, inducing Hispanics to live at 
home longer, and the younger age of Hispanics families. 
8. Citizenship 
Citizenship is one of the limited cases where disparities between Hispanics and 
non-Hispanics is not more pronounced in the Southwest but instead closely follows 
national trends. National and Southwest percentages of Hispanics that are U.S. citizens is 
74% and 75%, respectively. The percentages of non-Hispanics that are U.S. citizens are 
93% and 95%, respectively.107 The increased concentration of Hispanics within the 
Southwest, more specifically those of Mexican origin, typically correlates with increased 
disparity between Hispanics and non-Hispanics, as seen with previously presented 
indicators of sociocultural status. However, that correlation does not exist where 
citizenship is concerned.  
While the disparity between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is still pronounced, a 
different dynamic appears to be at play as the disparity at the national and regional level 
is essentially identical (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14.   Citizenship - Hispanic Community Comparison 
One potential reason for the difference is that increased immigration enforcement, 
or the perception of increased enforcement, in the region have counteracted conditions 
leading to increased regional disparity. Increased immigration enforcement would by 
definition target the removal of aliens leading to a higher proportion of U.S. citizens. 
Additionally, the perception of increased enforcement in the region might entice 
removable aliens to look for and take up residence outside the region, which would also 
result in an increased proportion of U.S. citizens within the region. 
9. Mexican Nationalism 
Although generally recognized as not being representative of Hispanic cultural 
beliefs, there are Mexican Nationalist groups within the U.S. that have some impact, 
however minor, in shaping Hispanic cultural identity. These groups appear to be 
relatively small, but the size and scope of these nationalist groups, however they can or 
should not be dismissed, as their founding documents contain language that is relevant to 
the central research questions.  
Many of the Mexican nationalist movements reference the Reconquista, or the 
mythical Aztec homeland called Aztlan, with some using that term to refer to land in the 
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Southwest that belonged to Mexico at one point and is currently part of the U.S.108 A 
number of these movements include charters or founding documents, which include 
language that can be characterized as divisive and may be labeled as advocating more 
disruptive or violent behavior. An example of such a document is “El Plan Espiritual de 
Aztlan,”109 which is still referenced by Mexican Nationalist movements like the National 
Brown Berets110 and MEChA111. Another nationalist movement of particular note, which 
uses that document, is the Nation of Aztlan that has been designated by the Anti-
Defamation League as an anti-Semitic organization112 and as evidenced by their online 
publication Voz de Aztlan113. The level of support for these organizations from within 
the Hispanic community is unclear, although the student organization MEChA appears to 
be more widespread with 400 chapters loosely organized through regional and national 
organizations.114 
MEChA’s constitution, first ratified in 1995 and as amended in 2003 in Section 
24, states that recognized chapters have the responsibility to “orient all members by 
discussing and reading historical documents related to the social movement, such as El 
Plan de Santa Barbara, El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán, and the MEChA Position Papers of 
Philosophy, Constitutions, Relationship to Outside Organizations, and Goals & 
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Objectives.”115 A review of El Plan Espiritual de Aztlan reveals the following 
statements: 
In the spirit of a new people that is conscious not only of its proud 
historical heritage but also of the brutal “gringo” invasion of our 
territories… 
Aztlan belongs to those who plant the seeds, water the fields, and gather 
the crops and not to the foreign Europeans. 
Economic control of our lives and our communities can only come about 
by driving the exploiter out of our communities, our pueblos, and our 
lands… 
Our struggle then must be for the control of our barrios, campos, pueblos, 
lands, our economy, our culture, and our political life. 
For the very young there will no longer be acts of juvenile delinquency, 
but revolutionary acts. 
Self-Defense against the occupying forces of the oppressors at every 
school, every available man, woman, and child. 
It is recognized that documents, such El Plan de Santa Barbara and El Plan 
Espiritual de Aztlá,n were written during the 60s and 70s when the civil rights 
movements were at their peak and such documents and rhetoric were not unusual. It is 
problematic that MEChA continues to reference that document in their current 
constitution, despite the divisive language, while certain groups that do not support 
immigration are very vocal about MEChAs use of those documents.116 Due to the 
absence of any significant violent actions by the group, it should be recognized that 
MEChA does provide certain social benefits to its members, such as a positive collective 
social identity and can act as a natural base for mobilization of resources to include 
political, economic, or even identity resources.   
                                                 
115 “MEChA National Constitution,” MEChA, accessed October 10, 2012, 
http://www.nationalmecha.org/documents/nationalConstitution.pdf.  
116 “The Scourge of MEChA,” American Patrol, accessed October 10, 2012, 
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Despite the divisive language in the foundational documents, it should be 
highlighted that these organization are not secretive, actively seek and include female 
participation, and have no record of violent protest or activity. Such indications are 
counter to those that can be used to gauge the potential for radicalization leading to 
violent actions. Perhaps more importantly than the questionable rhetoric used by such 
nationalist groups is the fact that widespread popular support for most Mexican 
Nationalist movements does not appear to exist. National Council of La Raza specifically 
objects to claims that the organization supports the concept of Reconquista.117 For 
example, Nativo Lopez, previously the president of the Mexican American Political 
Association in Los Angeles, when asked about the concept of Reconquista by a reporter, 
responded “I can’t believe you’re bothering me with questions about this. You’re not 
serious. I can’t believe you’re bothering with such a minuscule, fringe element that has 
no resonance with this populace.”118  
C. ECONOMIC STATUS 
As with sociocultural indicators, the 2010 ACS contains a wide range of 
economic information that can be used to compare the Hispanic community against the 
non-Hispanic community at the national, regional, and state levels. As with sociocultural 
factors, the economic disparities in the Southwest are typically greater than disparities 
observed outside the Southwest, although there are limited exceptions, such as when 
home ownership is examined. Similar to sociocultural status, economic status can provide 
insight to whether the Southwest Hispanic Community might establish a positive or 
negative identity based on how the group perceives their status or how the non-Hispanic 
community perceives them. Additionally, the economic status can provide a very 
valuable gauge of resources available within the natural base to allow for a social 
movement to form and be maintained with or without elite involvement. 
                                                 
117 “Reconquista and Segregation,” National Council of La Raza, accessed October 11, 2012, 
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118 “Mexican Aliens Seek to Retake ‘Stolen’ Land,” The Washington Times, accessed October 11, 
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1. Household Income and Disparity 
“In 2010, the median household income for Hispanics in the U.S. was $40,000, 
less than the U.S. median of $49,800.”119 Those findings are similar to those derived 
using 2010 ACS data which revealed the median household income is $40,165 for 
Hispanics and $51,315 for non-Hispanics, for a relative income disparity between the two 
ethnic groups of $11,150. As with population makeup, a greater disparity is observed 
when data for the Southwest region is focused upon. The median household income for 
Hispanics in the Southwest is $40,834, which is $16,834 less than the Southwest median 
for non-Hispanics at $57,668 (Figure 15).  
 
Figure 15.   Income Distribution - Median Household Income 
As discussed in a previous section, the average family size for a Hispanic 
household in the Southwest is 4.1, while it is only 3.1 for a non-Hispanic household 
(Figure 13). As a result, the impact of a higher average family size for a Hispanic 
household serves to amplify the impact of a lower median household income.  
 
 
                                                 
119 Motel and Patten, The 10 Largest Hispanic Groups, 11. 
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The largest disparity between Hispanic and non-Hispanic median household 
income was in Colorado ($20,392) with the least disparity observed in Oklahoma 
($7,828) (Figure 16). The highest and lowest median household incomes were found in 
California and Oklahoma, respectively.  
 
Figure 16.   Income Distribution - Median Household Income Disparity 
The income disparities contribute to the fact that the poverty rate among 
Hispanics is greater than among non-Hispanics. As a result, more Latino children are 
living in poverty—6.1 million in 2010—than children of any other racial or ethnic group. 
This marks the first time in U.S. history that the single largest group of poor children is 
not white. This negative milestone for Hispanics is a product of their growing numbers, 
high birth rates, and declining economic fortunes.120 
                                                 
120 Mark Hugo Lopez and Gabriel Velasco, Childhood Poverty Among Hispanics Sets Record, Leads 
Nation (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2011), 4.  
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2. Poverty 
In order to determine a person’s poverty status, the U.S. Census Bureau compares 
the person’s total family income in the last 12 months with the poverty threshold 
appropriate for that person’s family size and composition. If the total income of that 
person’s family is less than the threshold appropriate for that family, then the person is 
considered “below the poverty level,” together with every member of his or her family. If 
a person is not living with anyone related by birth, marriage, or adoption, then the 
person’s own income is compared with his or her poverty threshold.121 In this instance, 
poverty rates for Hispanic families are consistent at the national and regional level with 
only slight variations. However, the poverty rates for non-Hispanics in the Southwest are 
lower than in the non-Southwest. As a result, the already large disparity in poverty rates 
between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is slightly greater in the Southwest (Figure 17).  
 
Figure 17.   Income Distribution - Poverty Rates 
3. Employment and Occupation 
The employment rate and occupations worked are additional useful indicators of 
the economic status of the community that work in concert with sociocultural factors to 
                                                 
121 U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 102. 
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establish the community’s social identity. It had been expected that employment rates 
would be dramatically lower for Hispanics than for non-Hispanics; however, data 
revealed that the employment rate was slightly higher for Hispanics. For Hispanics in the 
Southwest, the employment rate is 58.1% compared against 56.6% for non-Hispanics 
with the difference being slightly larger in the non-Southwest (Figure 18).  
Interestingly, the unemployment rate for Hispanics was found to be slightly 
higher than non-Hispanics with an approximately 2% disparity revealed both nationally 
and regionally. The different findings for employment and unemployment can be 
partially explained by the slightly higher percentage of Hispanics (36.2%) to non-
Hispanics (32.2%) who are in the labor force.  
 
Figure 18.   Income Distribution - Employment Rate 
With employment and unemployment data showing relatively minor and 
counteracting disparities between Hispanics and non-Hispanics, the impact of occupation 
should be considered an important factor in the establishment of income disparity. 
Occupation data reveals that non-Hispanics are more likely to be employed in 
management positions, which would have a higher salary (Figure 19).  
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Figure 19.   Income Distribution - Southwest Occupation Comparison 
In comparison, Hispanics are more likely to be employed in service occupations 
that would have a lower salary. Additionally, a significantly higher proportion of 
Hispanics are employed in construction and production occupations.  
In addition to the potential for creating income disparity, these traditional 
occupational roles are typically based within hierarchical structures, which would aid in 
the formation of a less positive identity for Hispanics who are employed in 
nonmanagement and nonsales occupations.  
4. Other Economic Indicators 
Other economic indicators, such as health insurance, home ownership, and the 
value of homes also highlight the relative disparity between Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
communities, although findings differ as to whether the effect is more pronounced in the 
Southwest. Data regarding health insurance coverage shows that 31.6% of Hispanics in 
the Southwest lack health insurance coverage, which compares negatively against 13.8% 
of non-Hispanics. The observed disparity in health coverage was found to be consistent 
both regionally and nationally (Figure 20).  
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Figure 20.   Income Distribution - No Health Insurance 
Home ownership for Hispanics in the Southwest is at 50.5%, which is less than 
non-Hispanics at 64.2%. However, the disparity is less than that seen outside the 
Southwest where Hispanics ownership is at 42.8% as compared to 68.7% for non-
Hispanics (Figure 21).  
 
Figure 21.   Income Distribution - Home Ownership 
The median home value for Hispanics in the Southwest is $172,396, which is 
much less than the median home value for non-Hispanics at $259,362. This disparity is 
significantly greater than the disparity observed outside the Southwest (Figure 22).  
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Figure 22.   Income Distribution - Home Value 
The particular dynamic, of higher unemployment/unemployment rates coupled 
with the lower household income observed within the Southwest Hispanic Community 
point to the ability for and success in mobilizing Hispanics as an economic bloc. The 
higher unemployment rate and the lower wages paid by occupations more likely to 
employ Hispanics indicates the availability of a labor force that can be readily mobilized 
by elites. Elites involvement in forming policies, such as immigration reform or migrant 
work visas, to ensure access to Hispanics as a labor force is supported by the “political 
process” model of Resource Mobilization Theory. The higher employment rate can be 
seen as an indicator of the success in mobilizing Hispanics as an economic bloc providing 
a lower cost labor force. 
D. POLITICIAL INFLUENCE 
Two useful indicators of Hispanic political influence are the existence of 
Hispanics in the federal government, as result of previous elections, and the potential of 
Hispanics to influence political outcomes. Past elections have seen some relative success 
of Hispanics being elected to federal governments; however, that success does not appear 




community has or exercises political influence are based in part on voter eligibility and 
turnout, perceived importance of electoral issues, or support for a particular platform or 
candidate. 
Membership of the 112th Congress includes 31 Hispanic members, with 29 
serving in the House of Representatives and two in the Senate.122 The Hispanic 
membership represents 5.7% of congressional membership, 6.6% of the House, and 2.0% 
of the Senate. Further, Southwestern states are apportioned a total of 121 seats in the 
House of Representatives123, however, only fifteen or 12.4% of those seats are filled by 
Hispanic members, which represent the four Southwestern states of Arizona (2), 
California (6), New Mexico (1), and Texas (6).124 Finally, the two presently serving 
Hispanic Senators represent New Jersey and Florida, with none currently serving 
Hispanic Senators hailing from the Southwest.125 Considering that Hispanics make up 
16.3% of the U.S. population and 33.8% of the Southwest population, by all indicators, it 
would appear that Hispanics are underrepresented within the federal government with a 
larger disparity within the Southwest.  
Due to their ongoing population growth, Hispanics comprise a greater share of the 
nation’s eligible voters than they did just a few years ago—11.0% this year, up from 
9.5% in 2008 and 8.2% in 2004. However, the turnout rate of eligible Latino voters has 
historically lagged that of whites and blacks by substantial margins. In 2008, for example, 
50% of eligible Latino voters cast ballots, compared with 65% of blacks and 66% of 
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whites.126 These numbers reflect lost opportunities for Hispanics to influence past 
political outcomes while at the same time indicating a greater potential for influencing 
future political outcomes should participation of eligible voters increase. As 55% of 
Hispanics are not eligible to vote because they are under age 18, or are an adult that does 
not hold U.S. citizenship,127 the ability to affect political outcomes will increase as the 
Hispanic community ages and U.S. citizenship increases.  
The influence of Hispanics on the 2012 presidential and future elections will be 
reflected in the distribution of Hispanics among “battleground” states. While a majority 
of U.S. Hispanics live in the three Southwestern states of California, Texas, and Arizona 
none of the states are considered “battleground” states.128 Colorado and Nevada are two 
Southwestern states where Hispanics will wield greater influence as those states are 
considered “battleground” states where large portions of the population is Hispanic; 
20.7% and 26.5%, respectively. Another political factor would be whether voter issues 
perceived to be important to Hispanic voters would drive or increase turnout in general or 
for a specific candidate. As indicated earlier, the top issues for Hispanics include 
healthcare, unemployment, education, immigration, and economic growth, so any ballot 
measures or candidates who focus positively on those issues could expect greater voter 
turnout and support from Hispanics. 
Due to their status as the largest minority group, Hispanics have the potential to 
influence and shape political issues and discussions. However, the disparity between 
Hispanic legislators and the population may indicate a lack of political resources within 
the natural base of the Southwest Hispanic Community. The degree to which the 
Hispanic community is under-represented indicates their political resources are limited to 
affecting the political process primarily through elections and ballot measures or through 
the formation of social movements. In this way, politicians who support and in turn gain 
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the support of Hispanics can be seen as an example of political support by the elites for 
Hispanic movements, either through sincere support or need to control, contain, or profit 
from that community.  
E. ANALYSIS 
Although the preceding discussion treats the sociocultural, economic, and 
political factors as distinct elements, they are integrated within society resulting in 
complex interactions that allow a distinct and unique identity to be formed within groups 
sharing those conditions. For example, interaction between factors can be observed where 
language usage impacts education attainment, which then effects occupation, 
employment, income, and home ownership. Such considerations are not limited to the 
Southwest Hispanic Community but are relevant to any community or group being 
examined.  
While Hispanics make up a large, and still growing, share of the population in the 
Southwest, the sociocultural, economic, and political factors show that Hispanics lag 
behind non-Hispanics in many important indicators, such as income, poverty, home 
ownership, education, and language usage. On that basis, it would appear that 
categorization under Social Identity Theory would be accomplished in accordance with 
the minimal group paradigm resulting in the creation of a separate and distinct identity, 
although that identity would likely be less positive when compared against the non-
Hispanic community. The willingness and ability for the Hispanic community to compete 
with non-Hispanics for resources is therefore an important consideration, which under the 
most extreme of circumstances could lead to direct conflict. As shown in the preceding 
sections, the disparities between Hispanics and non-Hispanics in the Southwest are 
typically more pronounced, and therefore, the potential for competition and conflict 
under Social Identity Theory are greater in that region.  
The lower availability of internal resources would also indicate a reduced natural 
base that could be mobilized to form and maintain social movements. For this reason, it 
appears that the “political process” model would be the more appropriate model to 
examine the capacity and mechanisms for Hispanics to mobilize as a social movement. 
 63 
The ability of elites to contain, control, or profit from movements under the political 
process model is therefore an important consideration. For example, the Southwest 
Hispanic Community is underrepresented within Congress, which indicates a lack of 
natural political resources, however, Hispanics are increasingly able to draw upon 
political resources through the “political process” model of Resource Mobilization 
Theory although at the risk of such a politically oriented social movement being 
contained, controlled, or profited upon.  
A final consideration for Resource Mobilization Theory is the potential to impact 
voter turnout to support Hispanic or non-Hispanic candidates or issues. Although 
particular grievances are less important under Resource Mobilization Theory, 
understanding what a community’s grievances are is critical for being able to mobilize 
the community in support of or against candidates or issues. For example, issues related 
to increased immigration enforcement, or English Only requirements, will have a far 
greater ability to mobilize the Hispanic community than they would in trying to mobilize 
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V. NATIONAL AND GLOBAL PRESSURES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As with any other community, the Southwest Hispanic Community is under 
pressure from issues played out in the local, county, state, regional, national, and global 
communities that they belong to. Those issues have varying impacts on individual or 
collective identity and the sociocultural, economic, and/or political standing of the 
Southwest Hispanic Community. As mentioned previously, the top concerns for 
Hispanics, as identified in various polls, include the availability of healthcare, economic 
uncertainty and unemployment, immigration enforcement, and educational opportunities. 
While there are a wide variety of issues underlying those primary concerns, those internal 
or external pressures that have the potential to elicit an unusually negative response from 
the general community, or a particularly violent response within a specific segment of the 
community, are of particular interest. Research for this thesis indicated two potential 
issues that result in typically strong local or regional responses by the Hispanic 
community and are therefore appropriate for further consideration. Those two issues are 
immigration policy and language usage.  
B. IMMIGRATION POLICY 
Immigration policies and their enforcement have wide implications for the 
Southwest Hispanic Community, which can be better understood when viewed through 
intergroup relation theories, such as Social Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization 
Theory. Social Identity Theory allows the cognitive, evaluative, and emotional 
components driving intergroup relations to be considered when formulating policy 
options that have the potential to impact specific groups in an overly negative way. 
Resource Mobilization Theory provides an opportunity to examine how a social 
movement may form or be maintained based on the resources within a particular 
community or when supported by external sources. Immigration policies and their 
enforcement can be viewed as a means for certain groups to establish a negative identity 
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for the Southwest Hispanic Community and can be seen as a method of mobilizing 
Hispanics as a political or economic bloc using the identity resources of the community.  
In 2010, 97% of aliens removed from the U.S. were Hispanic, with 73% being 
Mexican immigrants.129 That data highlights the relative importance of immigration 
policy to the Southwest Hispanic community, as Hispanics of Mexican origin have 
previously been shown to be concentrated in the Southwest. Underscoring that finding is 
data that shows 24% of all Hispanics know someone who has been deported or detained 
in the past year. Among Hispanics who are registered to vote, 33% state that immigration 
is extremely important to them, with that value relatively unchanged since 2010.130  
Under the current administration, the number of removals has in fact increased 
with priorities focusing on those posing a danger to national security or risk to public 
safety. The share of convicted criminal deportations among all deportations has increased 
from 29% in 2008 to 44% in 2010.131 Such policies with general societal benefits would 
reasonably be expected to garner popular support; however, 59% of all Hispanics 
disapprove of the way deportations of unauthorized immigrants are occurring.132 It is 
interesting to note that disapproval differs depending on nativity of Hispanics as 70% of 
foreign born Hispanics disapprove of deportations while only 46% of native born 
Hispanics disapprove.133 Intergroup relation theory helps to explain these apparent 
contradictions due to the negative impact upon the Southwest Hispanic Community 
identity when the vast majority of deportations involve Hispanics in general or Hispanics 
of Mexican origin specifically. 
Two proposed policy options that represent complementary, but not mutually 
exclusive alternatives, are the provision of a path to citizenship for immigrants and 
improving border security while increasing immigration enforcement. There is general 
agreement between Hispanics and the public at large that both policy options should be 
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considered a priority (46% to 43%, respectively) when they are not thought of as 
exclusive policies. However, when the policy options were believed to be mutually 
exclusive, the general agreement disappeared with 24% the public supporting a path to 
citizenship while a slightly larger proportion of 29% favored improved border security 
and immigration enforcement. Those results contrast with the opinions of Hispanics 
where 42% favored a path to immigration and only 10% favored improved border 
security and immigration enforcement.134 The following discussion is related to recent 
executive policies that impact priorities for immigration enforcement, exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion for immigration, and allowances for deferred action for 
immigrants meeting certain conditions. These policies have a relatively major impact 
upon the Southwest Hispanic Community and should be understood in greater detail to 
allow that impact to be fully considered. It should be noted at the outset that these 
executive policies do not provide a path for citizenship but instead leave otherwise 
removable aliens in an ambiguous and uncertain status. 
1. Enforcement Priorities 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s central responsibility is to enforce the 
nation’s civil immigration laws in coordination with CBP and USCIS. The removal of 
aliens who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public safety are provided ICE’s 
highest immigration enforcement priority. This includes aliens engaged in or suspected of 
terrorism or espionage, or who otherwise pose a danger to national security.  
Those aliens posing a risk to public safety are further defined as those aliens 
convicted of crimes, with Level I and Level 2 offenders receiving principal attention. 
Level I offenders are those aliens convicted of “aggravated felonies” or two or more 
“felonies” each punishable by more than one year of confinement. Level 2 offenders are 
those aliens convicted of any felony or three or more “misdemeanors” each punishable by 
less than one year of confinement. These priorities are also applicable to the Secure 
Communities program to identify and remove criminal aliens. Second priority is given to 
aliens who have recently violated immigration controls at the border, ports of entry, or 
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through the knowing abuse of the visa and visa waiver programs. Third priority is the 
removal of aliens who are subject to a final order of removal and abscond, fail to depart, 
or intentionally obstruct immigration controls. 
Of the 387,242 foreign nationals removed from the United States in 2010, 
168,532 were aliens known to have criminal convictions.135 ICE estimates the total 
number of fugitive criminals at 500,000,136 which indicates that approximately 33% of 
the fugitive criminals were removed in 2010. The combination of limited resources and 
the establishment of priorities, due to those limited resources, resulted in the removal of 
approximately 215,000 noncriminal aliens in 2010. This indicates that, out of an 
estimated 10.8 million aliens residing in the United States, approximately 2% of the 
noncriminals were removed in 2010. Despite the relatively small number of criminal and 
noncriminal immigrants removed, the impact upon the Hispanic community has been 
significant.  
2. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Direction issued in 2011 and 2012, from Director John Morton of ICE, was 
intended to clarify the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in order to prioritize the use of 
limited immigration enforcement resources.137 Prosecutorial discretion is limited to the 
decision to enforce, or not enforce, a particular law and cannot be an “affirmative act of 
approval, or grant of a benefit, under a statute or other applicable law that sets guidelines 
for determining when the approval should be given.”138 Prosecutorial discretion does not 
require equal enforcement, or nonenforcement, in the case of two individuals with similar 
circumstances. In those cases, the person who was selected for prosecution cannot have 
their case reviewed, or force prosecution on an individual not selected for prosecution, on 
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the basis of being improperly singled out for prosecution.139 The second effect is that 
absent a clear exception, the decision to exercise prosecutorial discretion to not enforce a 
particular law cannot be questioned by those without standing to enforce that law. It is 
possible another individual, with prosecutorial authority, can decide to prosecute, but 
someone without prosecutorial authority cannot question the decision through the judicial 
system to force prosecution. 
3. Deferred Action 
In June 2012, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced140 a program known as 
the “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals,” which has the potential to allow up to 1.7 
million of the 4.4 million unauthorized immigrants ages 30 and under to qualify for a 
program that would shield them from deportation and enable them to apply for temporary 
but renewable work permits. Eighty-five percent of those eligible for the program are 
Hispanic, which is higher than the Hispanic share (77%) among the nation’s total 
estimate of unauthorized immigrants.141 The impact and response of deferred action 
remains to be seen, as it is a newer program that has not been fully implemented.    
C. LANGUAGE USAGE  
Language relates to Social Identity Theory due to its critical importance in the 
social construction of reality and impact on social identity formation/categorization. 
Social Identity Theory includes concepts of bias and favoritism towards one’s own group 
to maximize group resources. In cases where Hispanics and non-Hispanic are competing 
for resources, the social significance of language provides a distinct characteristic that 
can be used for categorization. Such categorization need to be associated with a particular 
social identity that provides a greater or lesser degree of positive valuation. Similar to  
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immigration enforcement, language usage may also be used to mobilize the Southwest 
Hispanic Community or the non-Hispanic population through the “political process” 
model of Resource Mobilization Theory. 
The issue of language touches directly upon the sociocultural, economic, and 
political standing of the Southwest Hispanic Community, which makes it a particularly 
relevant issue to examine. Language should be considered a Complex Adaptive System, 
as it consists of multiple agents who interact with one another and the speakers’ behavior 
is based on past interactions, and current and past interactions shaping future behavior.142 
Language plays a fundamental role in human society and culture, providing the central 
means by which cultural knowledge is transmitted, elaborated, and reformed over 
time.143 Language usage within the Hispanic community is subjected to external 
pressures, represented here by the English Only movement, and internal pressures, as 
evidenced by reactions of non-Spanish speaking Hispanic. These pressures will be the 
subject of the discussion to follow.  
1. English Only Movement 
External pressures upon the community are represented by “English Only” 
movements, which seek to designate English as the official language and mandate the use 
of English by government agencies. ProEnglish is one organization involved in the 
English Only movement and describes itself as the “nation’s leading advocate of official 
English.”144 ProEnglish guiding principles includes statements indicating “the right to 
use other languages must be respected,” while their agenda includes the adoption of laws 
declaring English the official language of the United State and individual states and 
ending foreign language immersion programs in public schools.145 
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On a national level, there has been no legislation passed that designates English as 
the official language, although a number of resolutions in various forms have been 
introduced in Congress with the intent of designating English as a national and/or state 
language. Senator Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa (R – CA) introduced a joint resolution on 27 
April 1981 to amend the U.S. Constitution to proclaim English as the official language 
and prohibit the federal or state government to require the use of any other language. The 
resolution was referred to committee without having ever being voted upon. There were 
10 cosponsors to the resolution of which only one was affiliated with the Democratic 
Party.146 More sweeping legislation making English the official national language, 
introduced by Rep Bill Emerson (R – MO) as House Resolution 123, passed the House 
by a vote on 1 August 1996. It was received in the Senate and referred to committee 
where no further significant action was taken.147 
At the state level, within the Southwest, various laws have been enacted in five of 
the eight states which recognize English as the official language and mandate the use of 
English by state governments to a greater or lesser degree. In contrast, Nevada, New 
Mexico, and Texas have not adopted any laws recognizing English as the official 
language or mandate the use of English by state governments.148 
The armed forces provide a suitable example of an omnicultural approach to the 
multilingual nature of their personnel. Army command policy is that “English is the 
operational language of the Army. Soldiers must maintain sufficient proficiency in 
English to perform their military duties. Their operational communications must be 
understood by everyone who has an official need to know their content, and, therefore, 
must normally be in English. However, commanders may not require Soldiers to use 
English unless such use is clearly necessary and proper for the performance of military 
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functions. Accordingly, commanders may not require the use of English for personal 
communications that are unrelated to military functions.”149  
The Navy has a similar policy whereby “Commanders may issue an order that 
only English be spoken in a work place when they have a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the rule (e.g., to ensure everyone on the bridge understands the orders to the 
helm). It must be clear that the purpose of such an order is to foster uniformity of action 
and operations within a work place. A rule requiring employees to speak only English at 
all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of employment; therefore, 
personnel engaged in personal conversation off-duty should be allowed to communicate 
in the language of their choice. Commanders should also be cognizant that some on-duty 
operations may require the use of other languages and should ensure that English-only 
rules are not broader than they need to be (e.g., Bridge-to-Bridge radio and interactions 
with a ground crew).”150 
Both the Army and Navy policies essentially implement a “do nothing” approach 
by limiting the circumstances within which a “do something” approach would be 
considered acceptable. This reflects an omnicultural policy that highlights similarities and 
effectively celebrates differences, most notably the Navy rule, which highlights on-duty 
operations that may require the use of other languages.  
2. Linguistic Isolation—Non-Spanish Speaking Hispanics 
Non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, in workplaces dominated by Spanish speaking 
Hispanics, have expressed feelings of exclusion or shame as they can only speak English 
and are unable to interact with the majority of their co-workers. “Fake Latino” and “Tan 
White Boy” are two of the insults that Joshua Saldevar endured from Spanish speaking 
Hispanics growing up in New York as a Hispanic unable to speak Spanish.151 Alberto 
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Padron, writing on BornBilingualUSA.com, penned an article titled “If Your Kids Don’t 
Speak Spanish, Are They Really Hispanic?” and expressed his disappointment for not 
ensuring his sons were bilingual.152 And David Madrid stated that he felt “discriminated 
against by my peers because I did not speak Spanish.”153 
Based on data from the Pew Hispanic Center presented earlier, these experiences 
are not likely isolated as the number of 16- to 25-year old Hispanics that can speak 
Spanish very well, or pretty well, decreases from a majority of the first generation to less 
than half of third and higher generations. The number of “third generation non-Spanish 
speaking Hispanics” can be reasonably estimated at 800,000 individuals based on a total 
estimated Hispanic population of 52 million154, that third generation Hispanics aged 18–
24 make up approximately 3% of the total population155, and the aforementioned statistic 
that only 47% of third or higher generations can speak Spanish very well or pretty well.  
The importance of language is that it allows access to a common stock of 
knowledge that allows for common participation and interactions with others in everyday 
life.156 Further “participation in the social stock of knowledge thus permits the ‘location’ 
of individuals in society and the ‘handling” of them in the appropriate manner.”157 In 
short, language allows us to interact with others and understand the context within which 
that language is used and respond appropriately during those interactions.  
Alberto Padron in his article about being bilingual stated that “language is social 
currency” and further stated that “in my experience, to the degree you can command the 
language of a given community is the degree by which that community accepts you. By 
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command, I mean not only the general language, but rather all the nuances, voice 
inflections, rate of speech, slang and other idiosyncrasies that denote your level of 
cultural authenticity.”158 His observations appear to be supported by data that shows a 
majority of Hispanics in the U.S. do not believe they share a common culture, instead 
recognizing “many different cultures.” In contrast, there is recognition of a “shared 
connection” through the use of Spanish language, as 82% of Hispanic adults speak 
Spanish and 95% of Hispanics state it is important for future generations to speak 
Spanish.159 
The positive identity that has formed around the ability to speak Spanish therefore 
creates a negative identity among those Hispanics unable to speak Spanish. Additionally, 
it is possible that multicultural policies will result in the creation of enclaves of Hispanic 
communities in the Southwest that will be self-sufficient, due to their size, local 
concentration, and proximity to Mexico. Those self-sufficient enclaves may not naturally 
assimilate with the non-Hispanic communities around them, as there is limited need to do 
so socioculturally, economically, or politically. In essence, multicultural policies aimed at 
diversity may have an unintended impact of dividing rather than uniting the population 
into groups of Spanish speaking Hispanics, non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, and non-
Hispanics. For this reason, and as will be discussed in later sections, an omnicultural 
approach would provide greater societal benefits.   
D. ANALYSIS 
The preceding discussion has focused on various policies that exert internal and 
external pressure upon Hispanics in general. Due to the concentration of Hispanics in the 
Southwest, which magnifies sociocultural, economic, and political disparities, it is 
reasonable to expect an amplified response as a result of certain pressures exerted upon 
the Southwest Hispanic. It is believed that the issues presented in this section are 
representative of pressures that have the potential to elicit an unusually negative response 
within the Southwest Hispanic Community, or a particularly violent response within a 
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localized segment of the community. With this in mind, it is useful to look at the issues of 
immigration enforcement and language usage through the specific intergroup relation 
theories of Resource Mobilization Theory and Social Identity Theory.  
1. Immigration Enforcement and Resource Mobilization Theory 
The pressure of immigration enforcement is viewed in a different manner when 
Resource Mobilization Theory is applied as the specific grievance is given much less 
importance. The availability of resources from the natural base to support a social 
movement from within the Southwest Hispanic Community is in question given the 
economic status of the community as presented earlier. Therefore, the “political process” 
model of Resource Mobilization Theory will likely dominate with elites providing 
material support to contain, control, or profit from social movements from within the 
Southwest Hispanic Community. In such cases, the Hispanic community identity is 
essentially the resource desired, as elites choose to provide resources in support of 
specific policies, such as immigration reform or enforcement, which have the capability 
to elicit provide popular support from the community. 
As current immigration policies are not codified in law and can be changed at any 
time by current or future administrations, the use of executive orders to establish 
immigration enforcement policy has provided an effective means of harnessing the 
identity resources of the Southwest Hispanic Community for political support. Even if 
unintended, the fate of otherwise removable aliens, left in an uncertain status due to 
executive polices in lieu of comprehensive immigration reform through legislative 
processes, have been tied politically to the fate of the current administration. Hispanics in 
the Southwest who experience the emotional trauma of deportations to a greater degree 
than Hispanics in the non-Southwest will be more inclined to support an administration 
that has taken positive steps to reduce deportations for those not posing a national 
security threat or risk to public safety. 
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2. Immigration Enforcement and Social Identity Theory 
Currently enacted immigration policies do not enjoy widespread support among 
Hispanics; however, there is agreement with the general public that immigration 
enforcement and border security along with creating a path to citizenship should be 
considered a priority. Recent policies regarding prioritization of resources on aliens who 
pose a national security threat or risk to public safety and increasing the use of 
prosecutorial discretion have not been as well received as would be expected given the 
emphasis on criminal aliens in lieu of noncriminals. Given that these policies were 
enacted in mid-2011 and 2012, it is highly possible that the impact of such policies have 
not yet been fully appreciated with such appreciation hampered by articles that emphasize 
removals have in fact increased. The application of Social Identity Theory provides some 
insight as to why these policies do not receive popular support within the Hispanic 
community.  
The terminology used to reference aliens subject to immigration enforcement 
actions provide one example for how Social Identity Theory can increase our 
understanding of intergroup relations. The Immigration and Nationality Act refers to any 
person not a citizen or national of the United States as an “alien,” or in certain cases as an 
“immigrant.”160 Aliens are considered “admitted” when they have been provided lawful 
entry to the United States are inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. An 
alien may be “inadmissible” when they present themselves for inspection and do not meet 
the criteria for admission or “deportable” when they have been admitted but are subject to 
removal for various grounds, such as criminal grounds. Those aliens found to be 
inadmissible or deportable are considered “removable.”  
However, various “groups” use terminology that is inconsistent with the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, which can be understood using Social Identity Theory. 
Those groups looking to categorize removable aliens in a negative manner will include 
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terms with a pejorative connotation, such as “illegal.”161 In contrast, those groups 
looking to avoid categorizing removable aliens in a negative manner will include more 
neutral terms such as “undocumented.”162 As with the preceding example of 
terminology, particular policies advocated for or against can be viewed in a similar 
manner as having a positive or negative impact upon the Southwest Hispanic Community 
identity. Immigration policies that have a negative impact upon the identity of the 
Southwest Hispanic Community or decrease their group standing relative to the non-
Hispanic community will typically result in competition or conflict between Hispanic and 
non-Hispanic groups where access to resources are involved.   
3. Language Usage and Resource Mobilization Theory 
As with immigration enforcement, Resource Mobilization Theory provides an 
understanding of how Hispanic or non-Hispanic groups may be mobilized using the 
“political process” model with language usage as the central issue or grievance. The 
groups in support of English Only policies use language and the framing of efficient use 
of resources to mobilize a conservative base, which is non-Hispanic and generally 
unilingual. Those groups who are against English Only policies use sociocultural factors, 
such as the benefits of language diversity to mobilize a Hispanic base that has cultural 
roots tied directly to language and is generally bilingual to support their platforms or 
positions. In this fashion, Hispanics, who might support conservative candidates or 
platforms due to their focus on economic or family values, can instead be mobilized in 
support of more liberal candidates or platforms due to their support for multi-lingual 
policies. 
4. Language Usage and Social Identity Theory 
Language policies, as both external and internal pressures, upon the Hispanic 
community were presented. Those policies that favor assimilation, as represented by the 
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English Only movement, have not achieved widespread support at the national level. 
However, support of similar legislation at the state and regional level has been observed 
in five of the eight Southwestern states. This regional support again indicates an 
increased disparity between Hispanics and non-Hispanics in the Southwest.  
The most interesting, and concerning, revelation was the creation of a large group 
of non-Spanish speaking Hispanics as society in general begins to embrace 
multiculturalism in lieu of assimilation. Earlier immigrants to the U.S. were subject to 
racism based on their culture, including language, and sought to learn English in order to 
improve their living conditions and take advantage of opportunities.163 Those early 
immigrants did not see the need to teach their children and the impact can be seen in the 
number of third generation Hispanics who cannot speak Spanish. However, as 
multiculturalism has expanded, subsequent generations have embraced the benefits and 
value of bilingualism. Non-Spanish speaking Hispanics on the other hand are not 
perceived as being part of that positive group identity, as the ability to speak Spanish 
provides an authentic social identity. The concern here is how to ensure non-Spanish 
speaking Hispanics may form that positive social identity. 
5. Hispanic Identity as a Resource 
The mobilization of Hispanics as either a voting or economic bloc provides salient 
examples of how Hispanic identity can be viewed optimistically as an important and 
valued resource, especially to the Southwest Hispanic Community. Those resources can 
be mobilized through either the “professional organizer” or “political process” model of 
Resource Mobilization Theory where elites provide support due to a sincere desire to aid 
the community or to contain, control, or profit from the community. Mobilization would 
generally be more beneficial to the community when done via the “professional 
organizer” model but can also be accomplished in an effective manner using the 
“political process” model when the benefits to the community outweigh the costs of elite 
involvement.     
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As a significant voting bloc, Hispanics can effectively exercise their identity 
resource as political elites work to mobilize the community in support of their candidate 
or platform. Issues, such as public health care, immigration enforcement, education, jobs, 
minimum wage, voter ID cards (which are resisted by elites in the U.S. while receiving 
general support for use in Mexican elections), and income provide a few examples where 
Hispanic identity can be positively employed. 
As an economic resource, Hispanics provide less costly labor in construction, 
agriculture, and manufacturing sectors. The data showing that employment rates for 
Hispanics is greater than non-Hispanics, along with a lower median income, points to 
past success in mobilizing Hispanics as an economic bloc. That unemployment rates for 
Hispanics are also greater than non-Hispanics indicates a potential for further mobilizing 
Hispanics as a valuable labor force. This conclusion is supported by ongoing calls from 
industry to reform the system for issuing workers visas for migrant and seasonal labor 
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VI. POTENTIAL FOR HOMELAND SECURITY THREATS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Rather than delve into trans-border criminal threats posed by Drug Trafficking 
Organizations or gang activity, which is not intended to minimize the significance or 
extent of those threats, the primary research question focused on the potential for 
homeland security threats posed by insurgency or terrorism. The previous sections 
covered the individual elements of intergroup relation theory, the status of the Southwest 
Hispanic Community, and some of the more important internal and external pressures 
upon that community. This section is intended to bring together the prior sections through 
the concept of radicalization as represented by the “staircase to terrorism.”  
B. SOUTHWEST HISPANIC COMMUNITY—FIRST FLOOR 
A review of the sociocultural, economic, and political status of the Southwest 
Hispanic community indicate a strong disparity when compared against non-Hispanics; 
however, the sentiments expressed by that Hispanic community does not generally 
support a finding that radicalization has progressed any higher than the first floor. The 
only potential exception is non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, as discussed in a following 
section that may have progressed to the second floor.  
While Hispanics may fewer resources with which to form and maintain such 
social movements, the costs to do so are relatively lower due to social media and believed 
to be beyond those available to the natural base. Additionally, there seems to be a ready 
supply of elite resources with which to form and maintain social movements. One 
indicator that supports a finding that the vast majority of Southwest Hispanics reside on 
the ground or first floor is the relatively minor support for social movements from within 
the Hispanic community that have existed despite the relative disparities and elite 
support. The lack of such support from the natural base and popular perceptions within 
the Hispanic community that opportunities remain greater in the U.S. contribute to this 
finding.  
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Although there are not a large number of Hispanic members within congress, 
there is general, but not widespread, support for Hispanic centered policies currently in 
place and being considered. General support of policies and the political process, along 
with the majority perceptions that opportunities are better in the U.S., are likely to reduce 
the motivation for social movement. However, this dynamic is fluid and may change as 
the costs and benefits of social movements are continuously weighed. The large 
concentration of Hispanics residing in the Southwest has led to the formation of a strong 
positive social identity, although less positive than that of non-Hispanics, that under the 
right conditions could be quickly mobilized by professional organizers if that identity is 
jeopardized.  
Despite disparities between Hispanics and non-Hispanics, which are more 
pronounced in the Southwest, a majority of Hispanics feel they have been as successful 
or more successful as other ethnic groups. Additionally, a majority of Hispanics, to a 
greater extent than the general public, feel that they can get ahead through hard work and 
that people are generally trustworthy. Finally, more Hispanics believe that conditions in 
the U.S. for raising children, treatment of the poor, and societal mores are better than in 
their country of origin.164 These positive indicators support a conclusion that Hispanics 
hold a belief that success in the U.S. is possible, and therefore, the need to climb the 
staircase to terrorism will not be seen as necessary or beneficial. 
C. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT—FIRST FLOOR 
Although immigration enforcement is a significant pressure being applied upon 
the Hispanic community, particularly in the Southwest, current administrative policies 
and differing views within the Hispanic community, there is little to suggest that 
radicalization due to immigration enforcement has occurred or has the potential to 
emerge as a homeland security threat.  
Immigration enforcement is currently focused on those aliens posing a direct 
threat to national security or poses a risk to public safety with priority of resources being 
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directed at violent offenders. While a majority of sentiments are not in favor of 
immigration enforcement through removals, there is both a willingness and ability to 
work within the social and political systems to obtain change. Additionally, there is some 
immigration support within the Hispanic community that mirrors support from the non-
Hispanic community for equal prioritization of immigration enforcement and creating 
paths for citizenship. The localized peaceful protests that do occur are typically formed 
when removal proceedings for noncriminals are in process. The prioritizing of resources 
on criminals, emphasis on prosecutorial discretion, more recent policy of deferred action 
for childhood arrival, and existing options, such claiming asylum or other various reasons 
for stays indicated there are a wide range of options that are available to stop, stall, or 
delay removal processes. In the presence of such options, the ratio between the costs and 
benefits of forming a social movement weigh in favor of working within the available 
processes.  
D. LANGUAGE USAGE—SECOND FLOOR 
Data on generational decreases of Spanish speakers reveals a subgroup of the 
Hispanic community that does not speak or understand Spanish fluently. Further, this 
subgroup is not accepted by the larger Spanish speaking members of the community, who 
value the ability to speak Spanish. Conversely, the subgroup is not accepted by the non-
Hispanic community, as they do not completely share the same ethnicity or culture. 
Understanding categorization as explained by the minimal group paradigm, coupled with 
the value placed on speaking Spanish in the Hispanic culture, and negative perceptions 
expressed by non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, there is a risk of this group to develop a 
negative social identity. This non-Spanish speaking Hispanic “out-group” lacks a “group 
identification” or collective “authenticity” due to the inability to speak Spanish. 
Essentially, those non-Spanish speaking Hispanics become linguistically isolated from 
the communities and culture they would normally belong.  
Due to the negative connotation associated with the group identity, the non-
Spanish speaking Hispanic will either try to join a group that can provide a positively 
contribution to the individuals identity or look to engage in social change. This social 
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change can be accomplished by changing the relationship of their group to other groups, 
or by becoming socially competitive and engaging in social conflict. There are various 
Hispanic organizations that can either provide the positive contribution, such as NCLR or 
engage in social change by pushing radical nationalist or ethnocentric agendas, such as 
Nation of Aztlan or the National Brown Berets, even if those radical organizations are 
identified as fringe organizations.  
Those non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, which might gravitate towards radical 
organizations that engage in social competitiveness or conflict, are of particular concern 
due to the potential for radicalization as visualized through the “staircase to terrorism” 
method. With respect to the non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, a large number will remain 
on the ground floor while a small number may begin to climb the staircase in search of 
the positive identity and justice that they perceive eludes them. They may feel that their 
inability to speak Spanish is the result of conditions on the ground floor that were not 
within their control, such parents subject to racial or economic discrimination as a result 
of speaking Spanish, and decided they would not teach their children Spanish. 
The first floor can provide opportunities for fair treatment, the ability to voice 
concerns, and improve individual circumstances. For those who are linguistically 
isolated, such an opportunity may be as simple as learning to speak Spanish and 
exercising mobility from the out-group of non-Spanish speaking Hispanics to the in-
group of Hispanics that speak Spanish. Additionally, some may find a more positive 
identity with civil rights groups, such as NCLR, which espouse nonviolent means for 
social change. However, the shame and concern expressed by Hispanics unable to speak 
Spanish, based upon their perception that a “shared connection” tends to exist between 
those Hispanics who can speak Spanish, and it seems clear that there are those unable to 
take advantage of such opportunities presented on the first floor and may have moved to 
the second floor. 
The more radical groups, such as the National Will Organization, Nation of 
Aztlan, or the National Brown Berets have adopted charters that are decidedly nationalist 
or ethnocentric in nature and appear to displace aggression on non-Hispanic groups. On 
the second floor of the “staircase to terrorism,” such displacement occurs as feelings of 
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frustration, dissatisfaction, and anger increase. Such displacement of aggression is 
concerning, however, it should be noted that there has been no evidence of physical 
violence attributed to any of these groups. 
There was no evidence found that suggests Hispanic radicalization is occurring on 
either the third or fourth floors, let alone the execution of terrorist acts characterized on 
the fifth floor. On the third floor, morality is transformed to justify an “us” versus “them” 
mentality through affiliation, secrecy, isolation, and fear. The nationalist groups reviewed 
do not typically act in secrecy or isolate themselves into men-only groups become riskier. 
The ability to obtain foundational documents, including those that may be perceived as 
divisive, and evidence that female participation is actively sought support a finding 
against radicalization occurring on third, or higher, floors. The absence of such findings 
stands in stark contrast to violence that has been perpetrated by members of extreme right 
wing groups like the Sovereign Citizens, which have clearly climbed to higher levels on 
the “staircase to terrorism.”  
With an estimated population of 800,000 individuals, the community of non-
Spanish speaking Hispanics is faced with a negative identity and general inability to 
move to a group with a positive identity. Left with little choice, the community of non-
Spanish speaking Hispanics is at risk for beginning to seek a positive identity or justice at 
higher floors on the “staircase to terrorism,” which eventually leads to violent 
radicalization. That no one in that community appears to have progressed higher than the 
second floor does not mean policy reforms should not be considered to prevent the climb 
in the first place. By enacting policy reforms at this stage, before any violent actions may 
be perceived as a necessary and justifiable action, will allow us to address violent 
radicalization at the most likely point of success. Omniculturalism is proposed as a policy 
that has the potential for addressing conditions at the ground floor of the “staircase to 
terrorism” to overcome theoretical shortfalls of assimilation and multiculturalism. 
E. CONCLUSION 
A majority (56%) of Hispanics indicates dissatisfaction with the nation’s 
direction; however, that view is more positive when compared against the general public 
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in which 78% state their dissatisfaction.165 It is also critical to note that in 2010 an 
overwhelming majority (81%) of Hispanics believed that there are better opportunities to 
advance in the U.S. than their home country.166 A very small portion (2%) of Hispanics 
indicated opportunities were better in their home country. In 1999, the proportions were 
92% and 1% respectively, which likely captures the economic and healthcare concerns 
that have been predominant in the last four or five years.  
The questions above can be considered as capturing all relevant sociocultural, 
economic, and political concerns of the Southwest Hispanic Community in combination 
with internal and external community pressures, represented here by immigration 
enforcement and language usage. While measures of sociocultural, economic, and 
political wellbeing of Hispanics in the Southwest indicate a more pronounced disparity 
compared against the wellbeing of non-Hispanics, the Hispanic community is more 
positive about the direction of the country and more importantly believes opportunities 
are better in the U.S. than in their home country. That finding is important in the 
application of Social Identity Theory for the Southwest Hispanic Community, as it 
reflects a more positive social identity when comparisons are made against a similar 
group in their country or origin. 
Application of the Resource Mobilization Theory indicates that Hispanics have a 
reduced natural base from which to form and maintain a social movement. Therefore, any 
social movements would generally follow the political process model likely requiring 
resources from the elites at the cost of containment, control, and profiting by those elites. 
The lack of the formation and maintenance of general or localized Hispanic social 
movement in the Southwest appears to support a conclusion that the costs of such a 
movement would outweigh the benefits. Unless and until benefits of social movements to 
the Southwest Hispanic Community outweigh the costs, the likelihood of a widespread 
social movement let alone a violent one can be considered to be very low. 
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The rhetoric used by nationalist movements, although concerning, does not 
constitute all that is necessary to form or maintain insurgent or terrorist activity. Unlike 
certain right wing extremist movements, there has been no evidence found to show that 
nationalist groups are actively employing guerilla operation or applying irregular military 
tactics necessary for an insurgency. There is even less evidence to support a finding that a 
terrorist organization would likely evolve from within the Southwest Hispanic 
Community. That is not to say that efforts, such as monitoring disparities, similar to those 
methods presented in this paper, or policies to alleviate those disparities should not be 
implemented such potentials for homeland security threats. Such policies include the 
implementation of omnicultural approaches where differences are acknowledged but 
similarities are celebrated. 
Good people can be induced, seduced, and initiated into behaving in evil 
ways. They can also be led to act in irrational, stupid, self-destructive, 
antisocial, and mindless ways when they are immersed in ‘total situations’ 
that impact human nature in ways that challenge our sense of stability and 
consistency of individual personality, of character, and of morality.167  
Playing upon the fear of non-Hispanics with regards to the dangers of illegal 
immigration interspersed with the perils of terrorists crossing the Southwest border has 
the capacity to induce, seduce, or initiate society into behaving in “evil” ways.  
Immigration enforcement and border security is necessary, but terrorist have 
historically taken advantage of the U.S. visa system not a “porous” border to gain access 
to the interior. This begs the question as to why Southwest border security is given such a 
high priority, to the point of failing to address the challenges of comprehensive 
immigration reform, when there has yet to be a terrorist who gained access by crossing at 
the U.S. Mexico border? Comprehensive immigration reform can be enacted that ensures 
a path to citizenship for those who benefit society along with immigration enforcement 
and border security that is both flexible and capable of addressing realistic threats posed 
by those intent upon harming this nation. 
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We are best able to avoid, prevent, challenge, and change such negative 
situational forces only by recognizing their potential power to “infect us,” as it has others 
who were similarly situated.168 There may be, at most, a small number of Southwest 
Hispanics that have climbed as high as the second floor; however it is still important to 
look at conditions on the ground floor which lead to the creation of negative identities, 
feelings of injustice, and/or perceptions of shame and anger. Of specific concern are 
those non-Spanish speaking Hispanics that may have climb as high as the second floor. 
Instituting reforms at the ground floor level is the key to combating any potential for 
violent radicalization at higher floors on the “staircase to terrorism” by reducing or 
eliminating the desire to climb to higher floors.  
Whether the status of and pressures upon the community are viewed through 
Resource Mobilization Theory or Social Identity Theory there are important 
considerations with regards to how future events may result in a major social movement 
to evolve from within the Southwest Hispanic Community. The continuing or expansion 
of sociocultural, economic, and political disparity could allow a tipping point to be 
reached where the benefits of mobilizing outweigh the costs thereby motivating 
Hispanics to form a widespread social movement.  
The specific limitations for Social Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization 
Theory should also be kept in mind when applying these theories to specific communities 
or events. As described earlier Social Identity Theory may result in competition or 
conflict between groups, however individuals may also take advantage of social mobility 
to change their group and obtain a more positive social identity. The example of the non-
Spanish speaking Hispanic learning Spanish provides an idea of strategies available for 
social mobility. However, early versions of Social Identity Theory does not account for 
preferences between the various strategies available. Resource Mobilization Theory can 
typically be very useful in interpreting events after the fact, but is more limited in its 
ability predict events reliably given the complex and varying interactions between the 
Hispanic groups and elite groups that would provide support.  
                                                 
168 Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2008), 211.  
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F. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations aimed at alleviating perceptions of shame and feeling of not 
belonging to society at large should forgo policies of assimilation and multi-culturalism 
in favor of omniculturalism. Assimilation seeks to eliminate the differences by having 
them subsumed within the majority language or culture. The English Only movement is 
an example of a policy of assimilation which aims to eliminate the use of other languages 
in government operations. Multiculturalism does not seek to eliminate the linguistic and 
cultural differences but to highlight, strengthen, and celebrate the differences.169 
Multicultural policies seek to create and sustain positive identities in the various groups 
and have likely attributed to the increased use, acceptance, and valuation in speaking 
Spanish in addition to English. This increase is evidenced by statistics which indicate 
today’s young Hispanics are encouraged to speak Spanish more so than their parents 
were when they were young however it is done at the expense of non-Spanish speaking 
Hispanics. 
Omniculturalism focuses on commonalities to build a basis of understanding and 
then introduces intergroup differences and distinctiveness to emphasize how groups can 
differ from one another.170 An omnicultural policy would address conditions on the 
ground floor by establishing a positive identity open to the vast majority of society which 
would eliminate or reduce perceptions of shame or anger that occurs among out-groups 
which are linguistically isolated such as non-Spanish speaking Hispanics.  
A related recommendation is to recognize Language as a Complex Adaptive 
System which will naturally adapt through learning or evolutionary processes in a manner 
that will ensure success and survival. Those languages unable to adapt have and will 
continue to disappear as globalization brings different cultures into contact with one 
another at an increasing pace. Rather than attempt to prevent adaptation through 
multicultural policies or force adaptation through assimilation policies, support for 
                                                 
169 Fathali M. Moghaddam and James N. Breckenridge, “Homeland Security and Support for 
Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Omniculturalism Policies among Americans,” Homeland Security 
Affairs, Volume VI, Number 3 (December 2010).  
170 Ibid. 
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omnicultural policies can foster natural adaptation and prevent development of in-groups 
and out-groups which then compete for resources.  
Natural adaptation, through omnicultural policies, can be accomplished by 
highlighting similarities and celebrating differences in a manner that prevents social 
conflict to allow language to adapt and evolve as different cultures interact in the normal 
course of events. This “do nothing” approach can only by explored when various groups 
understand the complexities of language and the unintended consequences of policies and 
bias. Approaching language as a complex adaptive system will foster that understanding 
and allow for alternative policies to be considered and successfully implemented.  
Acceptance and implementation of such approaches should allow us to 
realize a nation of the type envisioned by John Jay who eloquently stated 
“This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and 
it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so 
proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the 
strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and 
alien sovereignties.”171 
                                                 
171 James Madison et al., The Federalist Papers (Hazelton, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2001), 
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